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CREATIVE DESTRUCTIVE LEGAL CONFLICT: 
LAWYERS AS DISRUPTION FRAMERS IN 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Jack Wroldsen* 
Entrepreneurship, in theory as in practice, suggests creative innovation 
that disrupts markets and threatens to destroy existing businesses.  And 
when innovative entrepreneurs upend the status quo, the result is often 
legal conflict.  This article proposes to unite the legal conflict that 
entrepreneurs experience into one cohesive body.  This unified approach 
tracks economic theory on entrepreneurship—namely, creative destruction 
and disruptive innovation—instead of following law’s traditional doctrinal 
boundaries where entrepreneurial legal conflict is haphazardly dispersed in 
myriad legal specialties. 
Furthermore, this article proposes that the lawyer’s role in 
entrepreneurship is that of disruption framer, not transaction cost engineer.  
When entrepreneurs encounter legal conflict, transactional attorneys who 
typically advise entrepreneurs are often ill-prepared, irrelevant, or both.  
Beyond transaction cost engineering and avoidance of legal conflict, 
disruption framers develop legal strategy in areas such as social media, 
public relations, advertising, and political and industry lobbying, to guide 
entrepreneurs towards and through legal conflict. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Paris, France: riots in the streets, shattered windows, smashed mirrors, 
burning vehicles, bleeding hands, eggs and stones, and attackers trying to 
get in.1  The scene may be reminiscent of the French Revolution of 1789.  
But it is from the 21st Century, and it represents the core of law and 
entrepreneurship.  In fact, the scene shows the law of entrepreneurship. 
The fighting in the streets of Paris derives from a clash over economic 
opportunities between old-guard business interests (traditional taxi drivers) 
and upstart entrepreneurs armed with innovative technology (Uber’s 
Internet application (app) that matches riders and drivers via smartphones).2  
 
 1.  Alissa Rubin & Mark Scott, Clashes Erupt Across France as Taxi Drivers Protest 
Uber, NEW YORK TIMES (June 6, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/business/international/uber-protests-france.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/HQ2G-P8FZ]; Carol Matlack, Paris Cabbies Slash Tires, Smash 
Windshields in Protest against Uber, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 13, 2014), 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01-13/paris-cabbies-slash-tires-smash-
windshields-in-protest-against-uber [https://perma.cc/R23W-VGZ6]. 
 2.  Romain Dillet, Protesting Taxi Drivers Attack Uber Car Near Paris, TECHCRUNCH 
(Jan. 13, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/01/13/an-uber-car-was-attacked-near-paris-as-
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And though the conflict has boiled over into physical confrontations, its 
essence is a legal battle—one that has flared up not only in Paris, but in 
Brussels, India, Chicago, Seattle, and Denver, among numerous other 
places.3  It is the classic story of law and entrepreneurship in which 
entrepreneurs threaten to upend a stagnant market through “disruptive 
innovation”4 and in the process often run afoul of the law.  It is the 
inexorable reality of “[c]reative [d]estruction,”5 where entrepreneurs create 
new industries while simultaneously destroying the status quo. 
But despite entrepreneurs’ tendency to challenge legal precedent 
through groundbreaking innovations, the law and entrepreneurship field6 
 
taxi-drivers-protest-against-urban-transportation-startups/ [https://perma.cc/NWT9-LUDP\. 
 3.  Tom Fairless, Tensions Erupt as Uber Drivers Attacked by Taxi Drivers in 
Brussels, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/tensions-
erupt-as-uber-drivers-attacked-by-taxi-drivers-in-brussels-1427140080 
[https://perma.cc/X8MT-7P76].  A website dedicated to opposing Uber lists numerous 
protests around the world. News, STOP UBER, http://www.stopuber.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/KYZ9-YYR7] (last visited May 22, 2015). 
 4.  See infra Part II.B. CLAYTON CHRISTENSON, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA 47-54 
(4th ed., Harper Bus. 2011) (1997). 
 5.  See infra Part II.B. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY 83 (3rd ed., Harper & Bros. 1950) (1942).  Schumpeter’s theoretical 
framework has received renewed interest with the ascending prominence of creativity, 
entrepreneurship, and innovation in the Internet age.  E.g., Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Legal Mirrors 
of Entrepreneurship, 55 B.C. L. REV. 719, 736 (2014) (noting that “[t]he past three decades 
in particular have witnessed a ‘Schumpeterian renaissance’”); THOMAS K. MCCRAW, 
PROPHET OF INNOVATION: JOSEPH SCHUMPETER AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION 503-04 
(Harvard Univ. Press 2007) (observing that “Schumpeter’s pioneering work on innovation 
and entrepreneurship acquired a compelling new interest” in the late twentieth century and 
describing the renewed attention on Schumpeter’s work in numerous disciplines). 
 6.  This article refers to law and entrepreneurship primarily as a field or discussion, 
without engaging the friendly debate over whether law and entrepreneurship is properly 
considered a “perspective” or an independent academic “discipline.”  Benjamin Means, 
Foreward: A Lens for Law and Entrepreneurship, 6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1, 
5, 13-18 (2011) (arguing that law and entrepreneurship should be conceived of as a 
“perspective” or “lens,” not a separate academic discipline); Darian M. Ibrahim & D. 
Gordon Smith, Entrepreneurs on Horseback: Reflections on the Organization of Law, 50 
ARIZ. L. REV. 71, 83-89 (2008) (proposing law and entrepreneurship as a distinct field of 
legal study); Steven H. Hobbs, Toward a Theory of Law and Entrepreneurship, 26 CAP. U. 
L. REV. 241, 245 (1997) (“pursuing the idea of entrepreneurship as an academic discipline in 
the law school setting”).  For discussions of law and entrepreneurship in the context of other 
emerging fields, see generally Ibrahim & Smith, at 84 (describing the struggle for 
acceptance of other new academic fields, such as Internet Law, Health Law, and 
Environmental Law); Frank Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207-15 (grouping the “Law of Cyberspace” with the “Law of the Horse” 
due to an alleged lack of legal distinctiveness); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: 
What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 503 (1999) (defending the study of 
cyberspace law). 
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has been rooted in and continues to emphasize a transactional perspective.7  
Ronald Gilson’s seminal analysis of business lawyers as “transaction cost 
engineers” remains the primary theoretical model for the law and 
entrepreneurship field, even though Gilson’s model was not originally 
developed specifically for entrepreneurship.8  Under the transaction cost 
engineer model—including subsequent expansions on Gilson’s pioneering 
work9—attorneys add value to business transactions by reducing the 
transaction costs inherent to business deals.10 
To the extent entrepreneurship is simply about business transactions, 
transaction-based theories apply appropriately enough.  Start-up 
entrepreneurs do benefit from transactional legal advice.11  And 
transactional attorneys are often the first lawyers to represent entrepreneurs 
because in the start-up phase of a new venture entrepreneurs need 
transactional legal counsel.12  So it makes intuitive sense that the standard 
law and entrepreneurship framework would adopt a transaction-based 
approach. 
But the law and entrepreneurship field should not be subsumed under 
transactional law.  Instead, the legal theory that attaches to 
entrepreneurship should track a more robust understanding of what 
entrepreneurship actually entails.  Outside of law, theories of 
entrepreneurship do not center around business transactions.13  The leading 
descriptions of entrepreneurship, both in theory and in practice, involve 
disruptive innovation and creative destruction, where entrepreneurs 
introduce new products or new business models that threaten existing 
market leaders.14 
From the perspective of creative destruction, entrepreneurship is 
revolution.15  And this entrepreneurial revolution is often played out in a 
courtroom, not in the business transactions that typically garner the most 
attention in law and entrepreneurship studies.16  Each of the examples in 
Part III highlights a disruptive innovation that has been the subject of 
litigation or has allegedly or actually been illegal (e.g., among other 
examples, Uber’s court battles with the taxi industry, Tesla’s conflicts with 
 
 7.  See infra Part I.B. 
 8.  See infra Part I.B; Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal 
Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 255 (1984). 
 9.  See infra Part I.B. 
 10.  See infra Part I.B. 
 11.  See infra Part I.A. 
 12.  See infra Part I.A. 
 13.  See infra Part II.B. 
 14.  See infra Part II.B. 
 15.  See infra Part II.B. 
 16.  See infra Part III. 
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traditional car dealerships, and Napster’s intellectual property disputes with 
the music industry).  Consequently, the examples illustrate the central role 
of law and lawyers—outside of the world of business transactions—in 
determining how society deals with the legal conflict that creative 
destructive entrepreneurship causes. 
Beyond transaction cost engineering, then, this article proposes that 
the lawyer’s role in representing entrepreneurs is more appropriately 
deemed that of “disruption framer.”17  When the creations of innovative 
entrepreneurs threaten to destroy the legal status quo, lawyers take center 
stage.  But the lawyer’s role in representing entrepreneurs through the 
existential battles of creative destruction has little to do with transaction 
cost engineering.  The skills involved in crafting a long-term legal strategy 
for disruptive business models are not those of transactional advice or 
advocacy.  Just as entrepreneurs create a business plan to chart a disruptive 
course into new markets, disruption framers develop legal strategies for a 
disruptive company to reimagine and reform existing legal frameworks to 
accommodate innovative business ideas.  It is a mistake, therefore, to 
equate law and entrepreneurship too closely with transactional law.  The 
law and entrepreneurship lens must expand beyond business transactions to 
provide a more comprehensive account of the role of lawyers when 
entrepreneurs’ disruptive businesses break laws, as the examples in Part III 
show. 
This article seeks to unite creative destructive legal conflict into a 
cohesive body.  Traditionally, examples of legal conflict in 
entrepreneurship have been categorized and widely dispersed under myriad 
legal disciplines (such as innovation law, antitrust/competition law, 
consumer protection law, intellectual property law, securities law, and 
employment law, along with numerous other legal fields).  This lawyer-
centric approach obscures the commonalities that diverse examples of 
entrepreneurial legal conflict share.  Furthermore, defining the topic along 
the lines of traditional legal disciplines forces a legal rubric over a business 
phenomenon. 
But what if jurisprudential analysis were organized around an 
economic theory, not around a legal discipline?  This article proposes 
placing creative destructive legal conflict at the center and organizing law 
and entrepreneurship jurisprudence around economic theory, regardless of 
the boundaries of traditional legal disciplines.  The business reality of 
disruptive innovation should serve as the unifying principle of the legal 
conflict that creative destructive entrepreneurs encounter.  The result will 
be the emergence of a comprehensive and unified body of legal conflict 
 
 17.  See infra Part III and Part IV.B. 
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comprising the law of entrepreneurship. 
For example, when creative destruction leads to legal conflict in 
different areas of substantive law (such as employment law, intellectual 
property law, and securities law), this article suggests that all three conflicts 
be categorized as the law of entrepreneurship, despite the differences in 
substantive laws.  The diverse examples in Part III take an initial step 
towards uniting the law of entrepreneurship across multiple disciplinary 
areas, such as Tesla’s anti-trust litigation, Uber’s employment law 
conflicts, Napster’s intellectual property law battles, and crowdfunding 
entrepreneurs’ violations of securities laws.  A unified approach to the law 
of entrepreneurship will facilitate meta-analysis and empirical study of 
creative destructive legal conflict that would otherwise remain isolated 
within independent legal disciplines, as further explained in Part IV. 
Of course, lawyers and judges will continue to analyze cases within 
independent and specialized areas of law.  But from an economist’s or 
entrepreneur’s perspective, disruptive innovation and creative destruction 
are the unifying themes for the law of entrepreneurship, regardless of legal 
discipline.  To an entrepreneur, it does not matter whether a disruptive 
innovation encounters legal conflict from intellectual property law, 
employment law, or securities law—the common thread is simply that 
disruptive innovation creates legal conflict.  This article therefore 
encourages further study of diverse legal conflicts organized around the 
unifying principles of disruptive innovation and creative destruction. 
The result of developing a unified body of creative destructive legal 
conflict is also practical, not solely conceptual.  A comprehensive 
understanding of creative destructive legal conflict will arm disruption 
framers with the strategic tools necessary to navigate entrepreneurial legal 
conflict, regardless of the substantive legal discipline in which the conflict 
arises.  In creative destruction, legal conflict is an ever-present reality.  And 
disruption framers are the ones to guide entrepreneurs through this 
adversarial reality, as Parts III and IV describe.  Disruption framers use 
diverse strategies, often involving areas such as social media, public 
relations, advertising, and political and industry lobbying, to guide 
entrepreneurs towards and through legal conflict.  Disruption framers might 
welcome or initiate legal conflict, but at a minimum they anticipate and 
strategize for it because legal conflict often awaits their clients’ creative 
destructive business models. 
After this introduction, Part I describes the influence of transactional 
law on the law and entrepreneurship field and summarizes the numerous 
and diverse intersections of law, policy, and entrepreneurship.  Part I also 
reviews scholarship on law and strategy because the proposals in Parts III 
and IV extend the legal strategy literature to the role of disruption framers. 
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Part II draws on economics literature to move beyond the transactional 
conception of law and entrepreneurship.  Classical economics was 
instrumental in inspiring the transaction cost engineer model that pervades 
the law and entrepreneurship field.  Paradoxically, though, classical 
economics tends to marginalize the importance of the entrepreneur.  
Therefore, Part II argues that the law and entrepreneurship field should 
embrace an alternative approach to economics, one that places 
entrepreneurship and its creative destructive innovations at the forefront. 
Part III advances a thesis both conceptual and practical.  From a 
conceptual perspective, Part III argues that law and entrepreneurship 
scholars must cultivate a systematic and unified body of creative 
destructive legal conflict, without regard to legal disciplinary areas—the 
law of entrepreneurship.  From a practical perspective, Part III envisions 
lawyers as disruption framers who leverage the law of entrepreneurship to 
develop a strategic playbook for guiding entrepreneurs through legal 
conflict.  Part IV then offers forward-looking recommendations for further 
research in light of the article’s dual emphasis on creative destructive legal 
conflict and lawyers as disruption framers. 
I. THE LAW AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP FIELD 
In the interest of simplicity, the emerging law and entrepreneurship 
cannon can be organized into three rough categories, along with a fourth 
category that this article uses to explain the role of disruption framers.  The 
first category arises out of law school clinical programs in transactional 
law18 (including cross-disciplinary cooperation with business schools)19 as 
 
 18.  See infra Part I.A.  For listings of clinical programs, see Anthony J. Luppino, Can 
Do: Training Lawyers To Be Effective Counselors to Entrepreneurs, REPORT TO THE EWING 
MARION KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION 19-21, Appendix 2 (Jan. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Luppino, 
Can Do]; Richard Benham et. al., Entrepreneurial Law Programs and Legal Needs, 15 
TRANSACTIONS 727, 727-38 (2014) (explaining the results of a survey of law schools in 
relation to law and entrepreneurship course offerings); Transactional Clinics, 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP.ORG, http://www.entrepreneurship.org/entrepreneurship-law/law-
school-entrepreneurship-clinics-in-the-united-states.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z9ST-2SCV] 
(last visited May 1, 2015) (listing well over 100 law school clinics in the US “that provide 
assistance to entrepreneurs and innovators”).  
For a sampling of recent textbooks on law and entrepreneurship, see CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY 
& CRAIG E. DAUCHY, THE ENTREPRENEUR’S GUIDE TO BUSINESS LAW (4th ed. 2012); 
GEORGE W. KUNEY & BRIAN K. KRUMM, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL LAW CLINIC HANDBOOK 
(2013); W. “RP” RAGHUPATHI & JONATHAN ASKIN, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE LAW 
(2014); STEPHEN F. REED & ESTHER S. BARRON, ENTREPRENEURSHIP LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (2013). 
 19.  See infra Part I.A.  For listings of course offerings in law and business schools, see 
Luppino, Can Do, supra note 18, at 22-23, Appendices 5-6 (cataloguing course offerings).  
See also J. Mark Phillips, Entrepreneurial Esquires in the New Economy: Why All Attorneys 
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well as the many entrepreneurship incubators and accelerators20 where 
practicing transactional attorneys assist budding entrepreneurs.21  The 
second category contains the doctrinal backbone for the transactional focus 
that dominates the law and entrepreneurship discussion.  A third category 
unites broader conceptual approaches to how law impacts entrepreneurship 
and is concerned generally with establishing optimal legal structures to 
encourage entrepreneurship.22  A fourth category includes research on law, 
business strategy, and competitive advantage, which provides a theoretical 
grounding for the role of disruption framers in creative destructive legal 
conflict, as explained in Parts III and IV. 
A. Clinical Programs and Incubators 
In assessing the state of the law and entrepreneurship field, one study 
finds that “[t]he vast majority—though certainly not all—of the law faculty 
who appear to be on the cutting edge of law and entrepreneurship are 
affiliated with clinical programs.”23  Similarly, one of the non-clinical 
scholars of law and entrepreneurship asserts that “‘law and 
entrepreneurship’ thrives not in doctrine, or even in current 
interdisciplinary law and social science, but on the ground in clinical 
programs.”24  Achieving a clinical foundation of “what is now a ‘law and 
entrepreneurship’ movement”25 is a milestone in its own right, in view of 
 
Should Learn about Entrepreneurship in Law School, 8 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 59, 
67-72 (2014) (discussing entrepreneurship training in legal education). 
 20.  See Brad Bernthal, Opportunism and Informal Relationships in Investment 
Accelerators, STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. (forthcoming 2016), available at 
https://lawweb.colorado.edu/profiles/pubpdfs/bernthal/Investment%20Accelerators(SJLBF
%202016).pdf [https://perma.cc/9PJZ-MWV9] (describing accelerators and distinguishing 
incubators). 
 21.  See infra Part I.A. Stephanie Dangel & Michael J. Madison, Innovators, Esq.: 
Training the Next Generation of Lawyer Social Entrepreneurs, 83 UMKC L. REV. 967, 969-
83 (2015) (noting numerous programs where legal and entrepreneurial training intersect); 
Dana Thompson, Accelerating the Growth of the Next Generation of Innovators, 8 OHIO ST. 
ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 379, 379-85 (2013) (describing business accelerators, incubators, and 
other university resources that support entrepreneurship).  For a discussion of the practicing 
bar’s assistance to start-up entrepreneurs, see Kevin Davis, Venturing into Startup Territory, 
A.B.A. J., June 2014, at 55. 
 22.  See infra Part I.C.  For a compilation of scholarly perspectives on law and 
entrepreneurship, see CREATIVITY, LAW AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (Shubha Ghosh & Robin 
Paul Malloy eds., 2011). 
 23.  Luppino, Can Do, supra note 18, at 13. 
 24.  Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Why the Law of Entrepreneurship Barely Matters, 31 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 701, 703 (2009). 
 25.  Anthony J. Luppino, Minding More Than Our Own Business: Educating 
Entrepreneurial Lawyers Through Law School-Business School Collaborations, 30 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 151, 160 (2007) [hereinafter Luppino, Minding More Than Our Own 
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clinical education’s historical roots in litigation.26 
Teaching transactional law skills in an entrepreneurship law clinic is a 
natural fit.27  Aspiring entrepreneurs want low-cost transactional legal 
assistance just as law students want to develop transactional law skills 
through interactions with real clients.28  For example, typical transactional 
matters include activities like forming business entities, drafting governing 
documents, creating contract templates, and registering trademarks.  But 
the law and entrepreneurship field, as expressed through and rooted in 
transactional legal clinics, will necessarily have a built-in predisposition 
towards business transactions and away from litigation because 
transactional law clinics typically are designed to avoid providing litigation 
services,29 in keeping with the principle that “transactional work 
involves . . . assessing risks and actively avoiding the courtroom.”30 
Similarly, interdisciplinary collaborations between law and business 
schools focus on transactional legal services, whether in a classroom 
setting, in a clinical environment serving local small businesses, or through 
university-sponsored start-up business plan competitions.31  Law firms, too, 
embrace the transactional conception of law and entrepreneurship as a 
 
Business]. 
 26.  Susan R. Jones & Jacqueline Lainez, Enriching the Law School Curriculum: The 
Rise of Transactional Legal Clinics in U.S. Law Schools, 43 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 85, 92-
100 (2014) (describing the growth of transactional law clinics in the context of law school 
clinical programs that were historically litigation-centric). 
 27.  See Hobbs, supra note 6, at 252-64 (providing an overview of the legal needs of 
entrepreneurs and calling for appropriate legal training in law schools); Laurie A. Lucas & 
Griffin T. Pivateau, Attorneys and Entrepreneurs: Creating Value for Small Business 
Startups, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 717, 725-28 (2012) (describing necessary skill sets for 
attorneys to effectively add value for startups). 
 28.  See Jones & Lainez, supra note 26, at 96 (emphasizing that both law students and 
small business owners benefit from transactional clinics); Luppino, Can Do, supra note 18, 
at 6-8 (describing legal concerns that law students can address in entrepreneurship law 
clinics). 
 29.  For example, the website of the Entrepreneurship Clinic at the University of 
Michigan Law School is typical in stating that the clinic “generally does not provide” 
services for “litigation or dispute resolution.”  FAQS about the Clinic, U. MICH. L. SCH. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP CLINIC, 
https://www.law.umich.edu/clinical/entrepreneurshipclinic/about/Pages/FAQs-About-the-
Clinic.aspx [https://perma.cc/5RW7-SWDH] (last visited May 28, 2015).  
 30.  Jones & Lainez, supra note 26, at 97. 
 31.  See Luppino, Minding More Than Our Own Business, supra note 25, at 181-219 
(describing the structures of various collaborations between law and business schools); 
Luppino, Can Do, supra note 18, at 19-23 (summarizing the common goals and pedagogy 
of transactional clinics); Sean M. O’Connor, Teaching IP from an Entrepreneurial 
Counseling and Transactional Perspective, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 877, 883-87 (2008) 
(describing courses and an entrepreneurial law clinic with a focus on the intellectual 
property needs of businesses). 
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means of establishing relationships with promising entrepreneurs in hopes 
of generating future corporate clients.32  Firms routinely sponsor 
entrepreneurship incubators and even provide discounted office space, 
among other incentives, to help start-up entrepreneurs succeed.33 
Law and entrepreneurship has gained traction, then, through 
transactional law clinics, business school collaborations and start-up 
business plan contests, and law firms’ involvement with entrepreneurship 
incubators.  All share a transactional approach to helping start-up 
entrepreneurs.  And as a starting place for the law and entrepreneurship 
field, transactional legal services are a valuable and appropriate first step. 
B. Transaction Cost Engineers 
But when law and entrepreneurship is narrowed to include solely or 
primarily transactional law issues, then one scholar’s conclusion that “the 
law of entrepreneurship barely matters” is not too far-fetched.34  That is, 
although “theorists have attempted to . . . advance a theory of the law of 
entrepreneurship, in most cases entrepreneurship is about something other 
than jurisprudence.”35  This is a natural conclusion when the field of law 
and entrepreneurship is conceived of through the lens of transactional law.  
A transactional focus—by definition and design—necessarily moves away 
from jurisprudential analysis of how law intersects entrepreneurship in 
litigation.  Instead, attention centers on the paradigm of transaction cost 
engineering as the doctrinal backbone of the law and entrepreneurship 
field.36 
The transaction cost engineer theory is undoubtedly helpful as an 
explanation of why transactional lawyers exist and what value they add to 
business deals.37  The theory is premised on the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM) and, especially, on the failure of certain assumptions on which the 
model depends.38  Most notably, CAPM assumes a world of no transaction 
costs (among other assumptions) in order to derive a hypothetical perfect 
market where “capital assets will be priced correctly as a result of market 
 
 32.  Davis, supra note 21, at 56-57. 
 33.  E.g., id. at 57-58 (describing examples of such initiatives by law firms in Chicago, 
San Francisco, and Austin). 
 34.  Lipshaw, supra note 24, at 701. 
 35.  Id. at 709-10. 
 36.  Jones & Lainez, supra note 26, at 103-04 (recognizing “the doctrinal contribution” 
of “Gilson’s seminal work” as a foundation for transactional law clinics). 
 37.  Gilson, supra note 8, at 256-94; Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, 
Foreword: Business Lawyers and Value Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1, 7-14 (1995). 
 38.  Gilson, supra note 8, at 250-53. 
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forces.”39  But because transaction costs are in fact “pervasive,”40 Gilson 
posits that “[l]awyers function as transaction cost engineers, devising 
efficient mechanisms which bridge the gap between capital asset pricing 
theory’s hypothetical world of perfect markets and the less-than-perfect 
reality of effecting transactions in this world.”41  As a result, Gilson asserts 
that “the pervasive use of business lawyers . . . raises an inference that it is 
a cost-saving, in my terms value-creating, phenomenon.”42 
Gilson is keen to observe that value creation is not a form of 
distributive bargaining, where one party simply obtains a larger slice of the 
pie at the other party’s expense.43  Instead, Gilson’s thesis is that skilled 
transaction cost engineers actually increase the size of the pie itself.44  For 
example, just as a business improves its profit margins by reducing 
production costs (e.g., a more efficient factory leads to higher profits), so 
also a service that reduces transaction costs results in a positive return.45  
Transaction cost engineers create value by reducing transaction costs 
through skilled structuring of business deals.46  In sum, the raison d’être of 
transactional lawyers who facilitate business deals is “cost-saving,” or 
more proactively, “value-creating.”47 
Under a transaction-based theory, then, “[t]he best thing lawyers can 
do is to reduce transaction costs—in essence, get the law out of the way of 
the entrepreneurial engine.”48  To the extent such a transactional 
perspective encapsulates the law and entrepreneurship field, it is easy to see 
why the law of entrepreneurship may not matter much.  Even Gilson 
recognizes that transaction cost engineers need not be lawyers, for other 
professionals, such as accountants and investment bankers, can also reduce 
transaction costs in business deals, and in some cases more efficiently than 
lawyers.49 
 
 39.  Id. at 251. 
 40.  Id. at 253. 
 41.  Id. at 255. 
 42.  Id. at 254. 
 43.  Id. at 244-45. 
 44.  Id. at 246. 
 45.  Id. at 254. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Lipshaw, supra note 24, at 710 n.31 (“The thrust of this work is essentially 
Coaseian”). 
 49.  Gilson, supra note 8, at 294-303.  For instance, Gilson notes that lawyers’ 
“historical domination of that role [of transaction cost engineer] rests neither on its 
inherently legal character nor . . . on skills acquired through traditional legal training . . . ”  
Id. at 301.  Gilson therefore envisions two possible futures for transactional lawyers: “In 
one, the legal profession continues to play a central role in designing the structure of 
business transactions. In the other, however, the profession’s transactional role is reduced 
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Later transactional law theorists after Gilson have largely (but not 
universally)50 adhered to the Coasean51 doctrinal construct that highlights 
the impact of transaction costs on organizational or business decisions.52  
For instance, Schwarcz focuses on the role of business lawyers in reducing 
regulatory costs for corporate clients.53  Similarly, Fleischer suggests a 
“friendly amendment” to Gilson’s model to emphasize how business 
lawyers engineer regulatory costs to their clients’ advantage in the role of 
“regulatory arbitrageurs.”54  Looking specifically at venture capital 
communities, Okamoto stresses the value lawyers bring to entrepreneurs 
and investors alike by making introductions and signaling quality as 
“reputational intermediaries.”55  Bernstein applies Gilson’s paradigm to 
several value-enhancing roles that transactional attorneys play in Silicon 
Valley,56 and Suchman and Cahill highlight Silicon Valley attorneys as 
“facilitators” in venture capital financing transactions.57  More broadly, 
Dent argues that Gilson’s approach is too narrow and seeks to encompass a 
wider range of activities that business lawyers perform outside the context 
of sophisticated mergers and acquisitions as “enterprise architects.”58  But 
 
from engineer to draftsman . . . . ”   Id.  
 50.  Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Beetles, Frogs, and Lawyers: The Scientific Demarcation 
Problem in the Gilson Theory of Value Creation, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 139, 143-45 
(2009) (questioning the “privileged status as scientific truth” that Gilson’s economic 
explanation of the value of transactional attorneys often enjoys and offering an explanation 
centered on the “meaning” or “cultural or hermeneutic significance” of the role of 
transactional lawyers in consummating business deals). 
 51.  Gilson, supra note 8, at 253 (situating the CAPM theory within the “Coasean 
world”).  The allusion, of course, refers to Ronald Coase’s earlier landmark work on the 
impact of transaction costs on the organization of firms.  R. H. Coase, The Nature of the 
Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 386-405 (1937). 
 52.  See infra notes 53-58.  See also Peter J. Gardner, A Role for the Business Attorney 
in the Twenty-First Century: Adding Value to the Client’s Enterprise in the Knowledge 
Economy, 7 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 17, 36-50 (2003) (discussing transactional 
lawyers’ role in a global knowledge economy); Alison R. Weinberg & Jamie A. Heine, 
Counseling the Startup: How Attorneys Can Add Value to Startup Clients’ Businesses, 15 J. 
BUS. & SEC. L. 39, 42 (2014) (emphasizing the importance of communication skills for 
transactional lawyers who counsel startups).  
 53.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. 
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 486, 506-07 (2007). 
 54.  Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 236-37 (2010). 
 55.  Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15, 22-26 
(1995). 
 56.  Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer?, 74 OR. 
L. REV. 239, 245-51 (1995). 
 57.  Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the 
Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679, 690 
(1996). 
 58.  George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects, 64 BUS. LAW. 
279, 295-318 (2009). 
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the economic theory underlying each transactional analysis remains the 
same; thus, in accordance with the CAPM formulation, each analysis 
furthers the understanding of how transactional lawyers add value to 
business deals by reducing costs. 
Though a Coasean doctrinal construct is helpful to explain lawyers’ 
multifaceted roles in representing entrepreneurs in corporate transactions 
and business relationships, law and entrepreneurship as a field is broader 
than transactional activities, as the examples in Part III demonstrate.  
Furthermore, as Part II shows, the classical economic theory underlying the 
transactional approach minimizes the importance of entrepreneurial activity 
itself, making it a poor fit for modeling the law and entrepreneurship field.  
Therefore, law and entrepreneurship must not be subsumed under an 
exclusively transactional rubric and instead must embrace a theoretical 
approach where entrepreneurship is central.  Analytical tools unique to the 
study of entrepreneurship—namely, creative destruction and disruptive 
innovation—should guide law and entrepreneurship research.  The law of 
entrepreneurship matters plenty when viewed from the perspective of 
creative destruction, as the examples in Part III show. 
C. Laws to Encourage Entrepreneurship 
Other work that has influenced the law and entrepreneurship field has 
gone in a different direction than transaction-based theories.  Though not 
expressly unified as law and entrepreneurship research, numerous scholars 
have investigated how discrete areas of law and policy impact 
entrepreneurship.59  More precisely, this category of research is broadly 
concerned with how law can (or cannot), or should (or should not), 
encourage (or discourage) entrepreneurship.60 
As a baseline, scholars note the importance of property rights and the 
stability of the legal system as precursors for vibrant entrepreneurial 
 
 59.  See, e.g., Lawrence J. Trautman, Anthony J. Luppino & Malika Simmons, Some 
Key Things U.S. Entrepreneurs Need to Know About the Law and Lawyers, ___ TEX. J. BUS. 
L. ___ (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2606808 
[https://perma.cc/5G62-P8B4] (citing literature on numerous intersections of law and 
entrepreneurship). 
 60.  E.g., D. Gordon Smith & Masako Ueda, Law and Entrepreneurship: Do Courts 
Matter?, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 353, 357 (2007) (“law and entrepreneurship studies 
should focus on the study of the optimal legal structures that facilitate the commercialization 
of entrepreneurial opportunities, as well as the regulation of entrepreneurial firms”); Simon 
C. Parker, Law and the Economics of Entrepreneurship, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 695, 
695-715 (2007) (reviewing literature on how “law interacts with economic aspects of 
entrepreneurship”); Ibrahim & Smith, supra note 7, at 82 n.65 (cataloging numerous 
examples that “help us understand connections between law and entrepreneurship”). 
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communities.61  More aggressively, law and policy can also be viewed as a 
proactive tool for enhancing entrepreneurship.62  The countless efforts to 
clone Silicon Valley’s entrepreneurial success have inspired broad law and 
policy studies on how government, university, military, and private 
initiatives can foster entrepreneurship.63  From a comparative law 
perspective, law and entrepreneurship scholars have proposed the 
“adaptability hypothesis” as an empirically testable explanation of how 
“courts may facilitate the evolution of legal rules to address novel issues 
raised by entrepreneurial firms” — the hypothesis being that common law 
judges can “encourage entrepreneurship” because they “have more room to 
maneuver than judges in civil law systems.”64 
Other scholarly work related to law and entrepreneurship seeks to 
develop “innovation law” or “innovation policy.”65  Innovation law and 
 
 61.  D. Gordon Smith & Darian M. Ibrahim, Law and Entrepreneurial Opportunities, 
98 CORNELL L. REV. 1533, 1550-1569 (2013); Lipshaw, supra note 24, at 708-09 
(“Entrepreneurship flourishes in a society that builds the rule of law from Lockean 
assumptions about the primacy of property and the freedom to own it and trade it.”); 
Matthieu Chemin, The Impact of the Judiciary on Entrepreneurship: Evaluation of 
Pakistan’s Access to Justice Programme, (CIRPÉE, Working Paper 07-27, 2007), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1018901 [https://perma.cc/V34W-LBG3] (evaluating the impact 
on entrepreneurship of judicial reforms that increase the predictability and efficiency of the 
legal system); Parker, supra note 60, at 711-14 (discussing economics literature showing 
that “[w]ell-protected property rights help promote entrepreneurship and innovation”). 
 62.  Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, The Law as Stimulus: The Role of Law in Fostering 
Innovative Entrepreneurship, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 153, 183-85 (2010). 
 63.  See, e.g., Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639, 
647-69 (2014) (reviewing “key legal developments that enabled the rise of Web 2.0”); 
Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 717, 723-32 
(2010) (discussing the Silicon Valley ecosystem and the necessary elements to create an 
entrepreneurial community); Amir N. Licht, The Entrepreneurial Spirit and What the Law 
Can Do About It, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 817, 817, 850-61 (2007) (exploring whether 
“policy-makers [can] do something to promote entrepreneurship”); Megan M. Carpenter, 
‘Will Work’: The Role of Intellectual Property in Transitional Economies—From Coal to 
Content, in CREATIVITY, LAW & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 49, 52-60 (Shubha Ghosh & Robin 
Paul Malloy, eds., 2011) (describing university and government intersections with 
entrepreneurship); Abraham J. B. Cable, Incubator Cities: Tomorrow’s Economy, 
Yesterday’s Start-Ups, 2 MICH. J. PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 195, 205-25 (2013) 
(discussing “state-sponsored venture capital” through “venture development funds”). 
 64.  Smith & Ueda, supra note 60, at 364-65. 
 65.  E.g., Aryeh S. Friedman, Law and the Innovative Process: Preliminary Reflections, 
1986 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 6-37 (1986) (seeking a framework for the study of innovation 
and law); Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural 
Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 56-67 (2008) (proposing a federal “Office of 
Innovation Policy” to oversee and coordinate innovation policy instead of leaving it to 
disparate federal agencies); Tom Nicholas, What Drives Innovation?, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 
787, 789-807 (2011) (describing antitrust implications of viewing innovation from the 
perspectives of intellectual property law, supply-side economics, and venture capital 
financing). 
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innovation policy promote business innovation, or technological 
advancement, as the primary goal for legal doctrine to serve.66  For 
innovation law scholars, the relevant legal doctrine usually consists of a 
fusion of antitrust and intellectual property law.67 
In addition, as separate disciplines, antitrust68 and intellectual 
property69 each offer a wealth of analyses on the intersection of law and 
innovation, especially in high technology industries.  For example, current 
antitrust law scholars increasingly emphasize the harm to innovation that 
can result from excluding potential competitors from a market; whereas, 
antitrust law scholars have historically focused more on the classical 
economic concerns of lower prices and higher quantities achieved through 
competitive markets in the absence of collusion, cartels, and monopolies.70  
 
 66.  Herbert Hovenkamp, Competition for Innovation, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 799, 
800 (2012).  See also Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2257, 2290-310 (2010) (advocating increased attention on intellectual property laws that 
encourage the diffusion of innovations, not solely the creation of innovations). 
 67.  Sofia Ranchordás, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation in the 
Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 413, 443, 452-54 (2015) (noting that legal 
scholars have “narrowed the study of innovation to IP, and in certain cases to competition 
law,” and advocating “a comprehensive regulatory approach” to innovation law); 
Hovenkamp, supra note 66, at 800, 812 (arguing for harmonized rules on intellectual 
property ownership and antitrust enforcement); Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, 
and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 583-600 (2003) (describing a 
“competitive platforms model” for Internet and information technologies where competition 
law principles would merge with intellectual property laws); Mark A. Lemley, Industry-
Specific Antitrust Policy for Innovation, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 637, 641-52 (2011) 
(espousing an industry-specific approach where strong patent rights would apply when 
innovation requires substantial investment that cannot be achieved through competition 
(e.g., pharmaceuticals) but antitrust law would apply when open access and competition 
lead to greater innovation (e.g., internet technologies)). 
 68.  Howard A. Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the 
Internet, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1686-1705 (2013) (examining how antitrust laws should 
apply and adapt to rapidly-evolving Internet technologies); Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond 
Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 592-602 
(2007); John J. Flynn, Antitrust Policy, Innovation Efficiencies, and the Suppression of 
Technology, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 487, 491-506 (1998); Nicholas Timchalk, Note, E-Books, 
Collusion, and Antitrust Policy: Protecting a Dominant Firm at the Cost of Innovation, 38 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 161, 183-85 (2014). 
 69.  Safeguarding entrepreneurs’ property rights in creative ideas is considered vital to 
encouraging entrepreneurship.  See, e.g., Sean M. O’Connor, The Central Role of Law as a 
Meta Method in Creativity and Entrepreneurship, in CREATIVITY, LAW AND 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 87, 98-106 (Shubha Ghosh & Robin Paul Malloy, eds., 2011) 
(discussing historical influences in the development of intellectual property laws and 
entrepreneurship).  See also infra notes 78-80. 
 70.  Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L. J. 
527, 527, 559 (2013) (highlighting “the particular threat exclusion poses to economic 
growth” while lamenting that “[e]xclusionary conduct is commonly relegated to the 
periphery in contemporary antitrust discourse, while price fixing, market division, and other 
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With respect to intellectual property, prominent current scholarly debates 
investigate the role of patent law71 and copyright protection72 in innovation, 
and the role of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in creative pursuits.73 
Moreover, numerous studies examine relationships between 
entrepreneurship and laws in the areas of securities, early-stage investing, 
employment, and bankruptcy.  Securities law receives extensive attention 
because of the importance of access to capital for start-up entrepreneurs.74  
Venture capital contracting is a prominent area of study to understand how 
investors and entrepreneurs privately allocate incentives for successful 
innovation and risks for failed enterprises.75  Employment law heavily 
impacts entrepreneurship, specifically in relation to flexible hiring 
practices, employee mobility, and non-competition agreements.76  And 
 
forms of collusion are placed at the core of competition policy”); C. Scott Hemphill & Tim 
Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182, 1187, 1235-1251 (2013) (proposing “parallel 
exclusion” (i.e., coordinated efforts of multiple firms to exclude competitors) as 
monopolistic conduct due to the resulting detrimental effects on innovation); Tim Wu, 
Taking Innovation Seriously: Antitrust Enforcement if Innovation Mattered Most, 78 
ANTITRUST L.J. 313, 314-17 (2012) (noting that “from the perspective of innovation 
promotion, exclusion [of competitors] is. . .worse than consumers paying high prices”).  See 
also Stephen G. Breyer, Antitrust, Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75 
CALIF. L. REV. 1005, 1007 (1987) (describing the classical approach to antitrust and the 
market-based position that “antitrust is not another form of regulation” but instead is 
designed to “sustain market competition”). 
 71.  E.g., Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought about Patents? 
Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 959-
1011 (2007) (tracing historical influences on patent law). 
 72.  E.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Jiayang Sun & Yiying Fan, Does Copyright Law 
Promote Creativity? An Empirical Analysis of Copyright’s Bounty, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1669, 
1676-84 (2009) (reviewing the justifications for copyright protection). 
 73.  E.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 
YALE L.J. 369, 423-443 (2002) (discussing individual motivations for peer-production on 
collaborative Internet projects); Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive 
Fallacy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 623, 640-47 (2012) (arguing that intrinsic motivation, not 
the external incentives of intellectual property law—such as copyrights and patents—
encourage entrepreneurial creativity); Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and 
Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 513-36 (2009) (identifying “love, 
desire, and other passions” as motivating entrepreneurial creations more than the incentive 
model of classical economics). 
 74.  Ibrahim, supra note 63, at 753-61. 
 75.  Smith & Ueda, supra note 60, at 359-64 (reviewing literature on entrepreneurship, 
investor protection laws, and venture capital contracting); D. Gordon Smith, The Exit 
Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 337-55 (2005) (discussing venture 
capital contracting practices that arise out of entrepreneurs’ and investors’ divergent 
interests in exit events); Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons 
from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2003) (asserting that “the 
keystone of the U.S. venture capital market is private ordering—the contracting structure 
that developed” to finance “early-stage, high-technology” companies). 
 76.  For instance, the well-known comparison of employment laws in California and 
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bankruptcy law intersects entrepreneurship insofar as bankruptcy discharge 
laws affect people’s willingness to launch entrepreneurial ventures that 
have a high risk of failure.77 
The question of law’s incentives, or disincentives, for 
entrepreneurship is rich in complexity, nuance, and potential for the future 
of the law and entrepreneurship field.  Many discrete areas of law play a 
role in nurturing an entrepreneurial ecosystem.  Instead of providing 
another example of where law intersects entrepreneurship, though, this 
article proposes an overarching analytical paradigm that uses creative 
destruction as the unifying principle of law and entrepreneurship legal 
conflict. 
D. Law and Strategy in Entrepreneurship 
As a practical application of this article’s thesis proposing a 
jurisprudential model of law and entrepreneurship, this article also suggests 
a strategic playbook for disruption framers to use in creative destructive 
 
Massachusetts—the former seen to be encouraging entrepreneurship by frowning on non-
competition agreements and the latter viewed as hindering entrepreneurship through more 
robust enforcement of noncompetition agreements—shows how law can potentially 
encourage or discourage innovation.  See generally Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal 
Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and 
Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999); ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL 
ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1996).  See 
also Viva R. Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 939, 965 
(urging a uniform “rule of unenforceability of employee non-competes similar to 
California’s statutory provision”); Catherine L. Fisk, “An Ingenious Man Enabled by 
Contract”: Entrepreneurship and the Rise of Contract, (Duke Law School Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 157, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=983739 
[https://perma.cc/R53X-8ERW] (analyzing the effect on entrepreneurship of strengthening 
or weakening employee rights to employee inventions made on behalf of employers); 
Catherine L. Fisk, The Story of Ingersoll-Rand v. Ciavatta: Employee Inventors in 
Corporate Research & Development – Reconciling Innovation with Entrepreneurship, 
(Duke Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 120, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=924783 [https://perma.cc/HF9M-YJVS] (discussing a 1988 New 
Jersey case dealing with the enforceability of invention assignment agreements). 
 77.  John Armour & Douglas Cumming, Bankruptcy Law and Entrepreneurship, 10 
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 303, 305-20 (2008) (finding empirical support for a link between 
entrepreneurship and bankruptcy discharge); Kenneth Ayotte, Bankruptcy and 
Entrepreneurship: The Value of a Fresh Start, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 161, 165-75 (2007) 
(discussing the benefits of debt forgiveness in bankruptcy for small business entrepreneurs); 
Parker, supra note 60, at 708-711 (describing “the economic literature [that] has propounded 
several arguments claiming that laxer bankruptcy laws encourage entrepreneurship”); John 
M. Czarnetzky, The Individual and Failure: A Theory of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 32 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 393, 399 (2000) (explicating an “entrepreneurial hypothesis” of bankruptcy 
discharge that “provides the entrepreneur the assurance that if he acts honestly but fails, he 
will not be subject to debt servitude”). 
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legal conflict.  The disruption framer’s playbook arises from the foundation 
that scholars on law, business strategy, and competitive advantage have 
established.78  In simple terms, the robust literature on what constitutes a 
competitive advantage can be briefly summarized as strategies that create 
value over the long term and that competitors do not widely practice and 
cannot easily copy.79 
One of the early business law scholars to examine how companies can 
use law strategically to create competitive advantages proposed a four step 
framework.80  In Siedel’s framework, company managers first seek to 
understand relevant laws.81  Then they progress to a fight or flight reaction 
to legal problems.82  Third, managers develop preventative solutions to 
legal problems, and fourth, they reframe legal concerns as business 
opportunities.83  The fourth stage is the pinnacle of Siedel’s process, where 
law actually merges into business strategy to create enduring competitive 
advantages for a company.84 
Another framework for integrating law and business strategy consists 
of five pathways.85  In Bird’s framework, the first pathway is avoidance, 
where managers view law as a costly and arbitrary or random barrier to 
business.86  Firms can also take a path of compliance, where law is 
considered a necessary constraint on business activity,87 or a path of 
 
 78.  Constance E. Bagley, What’s Law Got to Do with It?: Integrating Law and 
Strategy, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 587 (2010); Robert C. Bird, Law, Strategy, and Competitive 
Advantage, 44 CONN. L. REV. 61 (2011); GEORGE J. SIEDEL & HELENA HAAPIO, PROACTIVE 
LAW FOR MANAGERS: A HIDDEN SOURCE FOR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (Gower Publishing, 
2011); G. RICHARD SHELL, MAKE THE RULES OR YOUR RIVALS WILL (2011).  For analysis of 
the ethical implications of law, strategy, and competitive advantage, see Daniel T. Ostas, 
Civil Disobedience in a Business Context: Examining the Social Obligation to Obey Laws, 
47 AM. BUS. L.J. 291 (2010); Daniel T. Ostas, Legal Loopholes and Underenforced Laws: 
Examining the Ethical Dimensions of Corporate Legal Strategy, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 487 
(2009); Daniel T. Ostas, Cooperate, Comply, or Evade? A Corporate Executive’s Social 
Responsibility with Regard to Law, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 559 (2004). 
 79.  See Bird, supra note 78, at 71-79 (discussing research on competitive advantage).  
Two particularly influential works on competitive advantage include MICHAEL E. PORTER, 
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE (1998) and 
Jay Barney, Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage, 17 J. MGMT. 99 (1991). 
 80.  GEORGE J. SIEDEL, USING THE LAW FOR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 22-25 (2002). 
 81.  Id. at 22. 
 82.  Id. at 23. 
 83.  Id. at 23-25. 
 84.  E.g., id. at 24-25, 52-55, 71-75. 
 85.  Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 12-38 
(2008); Robert C. Bird & David Orozco, Finding the Right Corporate Legal Strategy, 56 
MIT SLOAN MGT. REV. 81, 82-88 (2014). 
 86.  Id. at 12-17. 
 87.  Id. at 17-23. 
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prevention, where law is used to preempt particular business risks.88  The 
fourth pathway moves law to the value-creation level, where legal 
strategies result in a tangible boost to the firm’s bottom line.89  Finally, the 
fifth pathway involves transformation, where legal strategy becomes an 
essential component of long-term business strategy.90  Firms on the fifth 
pathway capture competitive advantages because legal strategies create 
value for the company and merge into the company’s very identity and 
culture, transforming the company in such a way that competitors cannot 
easily imitate.91 
A third conception of legal strategy as competitive advantage in 
business centers around the notion of “legal astuteness.”92  Bagley analyzes 
the degrees of legal astuteness that top management teams possess.93  She 
especially emphasizes a proactive instead of reactive approach to legal 
issues, wise and deliberative judgment in assessing legal questions, and 
intimate knowledge of a company’s business as a precursor to high-quality 
legal advice.94  Under Bagley’s approach, the more legally astute a 
company’s management team becomes, the more likely the company is to 
seize competitive advantages through legal strategy that seamlessly 
complements business objectives.95 
As explained in Part IV.B., the role of disruption framers extends the 
law, business strategy, and competitive advantage literature into the context 
of creative destructive legal conflict.96  And the role of disruption framers 
reaches the highest tiers of legal strategy that current models identify.  
Specifically, disruption framers operate at the level of reframing legal 
issues as business opportunities (Siedel), transforming entrepreneurial 
firms through strategic use of law (Bird), and developing legal astuteness 
 
 88.  Id. at 23-26. 
 89.  Id. at 27-31. 
 90.  Id. at 31-38. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Constance E. Bagley, Winning Legally: The Value of Legal Astuteness, 33 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 378, 379 (2008). 
 93.  Id. at 383. 
 94.  Id. at 380-83. 
 95.  Id. at 383, 387. 
 96.  Other recent extensions of the law, strategy, and competitive advantage literature 
include intellectual property (David Orozco, Legal Knowledge as an Intellectual Property 
Managerial Resource, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 687 (2010)), contract law (Larry A. DiMatteo, 
Strategic Contracting: Contract Law as a Source of Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 727 (2010)), international business (Justin W. Evans & Anthony L. Gabel, Legal 
Competitive Advantage and Legal Entrepreneurship: A Preliminary International 
Framework, 39 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COMP. REG. 333 (2014)), and crowdfunding 
entrepreneurship (Jack Wroldsen, Proactive Law as Competitive Advantage in 
Crowdfunding, in STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO SUCCESSFUL CROWDFUNDING (D. Assadi ed., 
IGI Global (2015)). 
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as an integral part of business strategy (Bagley). 
II. ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ECONOMICS 
Before progressing to examples of the article’s thesis in Part III, Part 
II explains how economic theory undergirds legal analysis in the law and 
entrepreneurship field.  The transactional account of entrepreneurship is 
based on a classical approach to economics whose models ironically leave 
little room for entrepreneurial activity.  In contrast, this article advocates an 
economic theory of entrepreneurship that places preeminent importance on 
entrepreneurs’ creative destructive activities.  Viewing entrepreneurship 
through a creative destructive lens is the springboard for the article’s dual 
emphasis on the need for a unified body of creative destructive legal 
conflict and the lawyer’s role as a disruption framer. 
A. Entrepreneurs in Classical Economics 
The transaction-based explanation of what business lawyers do arose 
out of classical economic theory.  As noted in Part I.B, to explain how 
lawyers add value to business deals by reducing transaction costs, Gilson’s 
transaction cost engineer model explicitly relies on the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM), which is part and parcel of classical economics.97  In broad 
overview, classical economics posits as a fundamental tenet that supply and 
demand forces continually propel the economy towards a state of balanced 
equilibrium.98  In classical economics, the analytical inquiry remains 
largely centered on business transactions where marginal cost and marginal 
utility dictate rational economic behavior.99  And though behavioral 
economics helpfully demonstrates the shortcomings of the rational actor 
assumption,100 behavioral economics generally does not alter the 
overarching analytical paradigm of classical economics that focuses on 
 
 97.  Gilson, supra note 8, at 250-53. Beyond Gilson, the law and economics literature is 
vast.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, (Aspen Pub., 7th ed., 
2007) (examining the application of economic principles to the legal system). 
 98.  Herbert Hovenkamp, Schumpeterian Competition and Antitrust, 1-3 (Univ. of Iowa 
Legal Studies Research Paper 08-43, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1275986 [https://perma.cc/U23T-
AP57].  In contrast, “Schumpeter argues that capitalism’s defining trait of constant change 
and innovation makes the whole idea of ‘equilibrium’ misleading.” MCCRAW, supra note 5, 
at 163. 
 99.  Licht, supra note 63, at 820.  
 100.  Three recent and highly influential works in the burgeoning behavioral economics 
field include DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL (Harper Perennial, 2010), DANIEL 
KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2013) and RICHARD 
THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (Penguin Books, 2009). 
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supply and demand forces leading to market equilibrium.101  Under a 
classical economic analysis, even as further elucidated through the insights 
of behavioral economics, transactional lawyers are indeed central, as they 
help grease the wheels of capitalism by helping consummate business 
deals.  They reduce transaction costs, structure business enterprises 
efficiently, improve regulatory treatment of corporate transactions, and 
serve as reputational intermediaries.102 
But classical economic theory largely ignores the entrepreneur: “From 
Adam Smith and David Ricardo on, a venerable line of classical and 
neoclassical economists have developed market models that assign little to 
no special significance to the entrepreneur.”103  For instance, 
“[e]ntrepreneurs are largely absent from the economic theory of [Adam] 
Smith—he never uses the term . . . .”104  Instead, Smith’s “depiction of an 
‘invisible hand’ leading to market equilibrium drew attention away from 
the entrepreneur’s self-consciously generative role.”105  And following 
Smith’s impetus, influential economists like John Maynard Keynes106 as 
well as neoclassical economists in the twentieth century “have likewise 
tended to trivialize entrepreneurship in their formal models of a steady-
state economy.”107 
 
 101.  For instance, in reviewing recent economics scholarship on entrepreneurship, the 
authors state that “ [a]lthough maximizing agents and equilibrium concepts are still at the 
core of most models in behavioral economics, rational motivations are not required.”  Maria 
Minniti & Moren Lévesque, Recent Developments in the Economics of Entrepreneurship, 
23 J. BUS. VENTURING 603, 607 (2008). 
 102.  See supra Part I.B. 
 103.  David E. Pozen, We Are All Entrepreneurs Now, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 283, 
288 (2008); MCCRAW, supra note 5, at 70 (observing that “even though . . . [continual 
economic change] resonates with the experience of nearly all businesspeople, [it] has 
seldom been embraced by academic economists . . . . .[U]nlike the idea of equilibrium, the 
phenomenon of entrepreneurship is almost impossible to ‘model’ through the use of 
equations yielding mathematical proof. Thus, even though academic economists have 
moved beyond the steady state, they have paid little attention to the entrepreneur, even to 
this day.”). 
 104.  Pozen, supra note 103, at 288. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  MCCRAW, supra note 5, at 481 (underscoring that Schumpeter believed “most 
economists had lost sight of the heart of the capitalist process, which in its endless 
dynamism was the opposite of Keynesian stagnationism.”).  For a discussion of the 
influence of and differences between Keynes and Schumpeter, see Peter Drucker, 
Schumpeter and Keynes, FORBES (May 23, 1983), available at 
http://www.forbes.com/2007/10/10/schumpeter-keynes-economics-biz-
cz_pd_1011schumpeter.html [https://perma.cc/BFA7-JR99]. 
 107.  Pozen, supra note 103, at 288; MCCRAW, supra note 5, at 72 (“Schumpeter . . . 
argues that entrepreneurial interventions make the notion of the steady state a mere fiction, 
nothing more than a hypothetical teaching device.  The idea of equilibrium itself becomes 
problematical, since continual disruption is the basis for economic development and 
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In an economic analysis where hypothetical models postulate perfect 
competition, perfect knowledge or information, and market equilibrium, 
little room is left for the destabilizing force of entrepreneurship.108  The 
focus turns to how scarce resources are used most productively “thanks to 
market transactions that lead to equalizing marginal costs and utilities.”109  
Such a view of economics positions firms as the primary economic actors, 
and from the classical economic viewpoint, “the entrepreneur is nothing 
more than a person owning a firm.”110 
It is at best incongruous and ironic, then, that the law and 
entrepreneurship field would gravitate towards and come to be closely 
associated with a transaction-based approach derived from an economic 
theory that deemphasizes entrepreneurship.  And because Gilson’s 
transaction cost engineer paradigm is explicitly based on the assumptions 
of the classical economic model, it also fails to provide a comprehensive 
lens for studying entrepreneurship.  For instance, in expressing skepticism 
about Gilson’s approach, Lipshaw observes that “[n]either physical science 
nor social science has an answer for radical, unexpected, game-changing, 
paradigm-shifting surprise.”111  And as discussed in Part II.B, the lifeblood 
of a creative destructive approach to economics is precisely the point where 
classical economics falters: radical, unexpected, game-changing, paradigm-
shifting innovation.  The law and entrepreneurship field must therefore 
embrace a more robust vision of law’s relationship to entrepreneurship 
stemming from an economic theory that prioritizes instead of marginalizes 
entrepreneurial activity. 
B. Entrepreneurs in Creative Destructive Economics 
The law and entrepreneurship field should take its analytical cue from 
 
embodies the essence of capitalism.”). 
 108.  Eyal-Cohen, supra note 5, at 733-34; Pozen, supra note 103, at 289 (asserting that 
in such a world “entrepreneurs would have nothing to offer; the concept of entrepreneurship 
would not even make much sense.”); MCCRAW, supra note 5, at 353 (“Such models [of 
perfect competition] contemplate frictionless transactions . . . . Perfect competition lends 
itself very well to mathematical modeling, . . . and that advantage has been almost 
irresistible to economists. But because it neglects the dynamics of creative destruction, 
Schumpeter finds perfect competition wholly unsuitable for understanding a modern 
capitalist economy.”).  
 109.  Licht, supra note 63, at 820; Thomas Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect 
Competition: Kodak and Nonstructural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1994) 
(observing that “[p]rice and cost rule this artificial world. Market prices are dictated by the 
equilibrium of supply and demand.”).  
 110.  Id. at 821. 
 111.  Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, What Is It Like to Be a Beetle? The Timelessness Problem in 
Gilson’s Value Creation Hypothesis, 15 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 23, 37 (2014). 
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leading economic theory on the nature112 of entrepreneurship.  Though a 
precise, all-encompassing definition of entrepreneurship may remain 
elusive,113 certain fundamental components of entrepreneurship are well 
established, as explained below.  This article focuses solely on a creative 
destructive theory of entrepreneurship: the dialectical process whereby 
entrepreneurs create new markets and simultaneously destroy existing 
markets or market leaders through disruptive innovation. 
Abstractly, the term “entrepreneurship” connotes creativity or novelty 
applied to opportunity,114 and an interdisciplinary context is immediately 
apparent.115  Historically, the study of entrepreneurship owes much to the 
initial insights of Richard Cantillon, who not only “introduced the term into 
mainstream economic discourse” in the mid-1750s but also “identif[ied] 
risk bearing as a constitutive element.”116  In the 1900s, Frank Knight’s 
impetus further refined the understanding of entrepreneurship through 
research that distinguished between risk and uncertainty.117  Knight argued 
 
 112.  Entrepreneurship can be limited to start-up company innovation backed by venture 
capital investment, expanded to small business “mom-and-pop” operations, or widened to 
“intrapreneurship” that established firms pursue to launch new products.  Means, supra note 
7, at 7-15; Smith & Ueda, supra note 60, at 356.  Beyond capitalist entrepreneurs, the 
definition can also encompass other types of entrepreneurs—social entrepreneurs, policy 
entrepreneurs, norm entrepreneurs.  See Pozen, supra note 103, at 294-315 (chronicling 
society’s and scholars’ application of the term “entrepreneur” in a variety of contexts); 
Robin Paul Malloy, Real Estate Transactions and Entrepreneurship: Transforming Value 
Through Exchange, 43 IND. L. REV. 1105, 1116-21 (2010) (discussing “entrepreneurship as 
occurring in three different market settings identifiable as private, public and social 
entrepreneurship” and identifying four types of entrepreneurs: simple transaction 
entrepreneur, speculator entrepreneur, innovator entrepreneur, and network entrepreneur).  
A leading school of entrepreneurship even has a trademarked phrase to describe itself as the 
educator for “Entrepreneurs of All Kinds.”  About Babson, BABSON COLLEGE, 
http://www.babson.edu/about-babson/Pages/home.aspx [https://perma.cc/5HGP-CXL8] (last 
visited May 1, 2015). 
 113.  Pozen, supra note 103, at 285 (“Theories of entrepreneurship abound, but we have 
no completely satisfying synthetic account of the practice, and we probably never will.”); 
Licht, supra note 63, at 819 (“A well-known problem in the . . . field of entrepreneurship is 
the lack of an agreed definition . . . .”); Smith & Ueda, supra note 60, at 355 (noting that 
“entrepreneurship as a distinct field of research is still searching for an identity”); Means, 
supra note 6, at 5-12; Ibrahim & Smith, supra note 6, at 83-89. 
 114.  See Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 61, at 1540-1545 (summarizing academic 
research on “entrepreneurial opportunities”); Ibrahim & Smith, supra note 6, at 84. 
 115.  See R. Duane Ireland & Justin W. Webb, A Cross-Disciplinary Exploration of 
Entrepreneurship Research, 33 J. MGMT. 891, 894 (2007) (cataloguing entrepreneurship 
research in distinct academic disciplines, including accounting, anthropology, economics, 
finance, management, marketing, operations management, political science, psychology, 
and sociology); Licht, supra note 63, at 819-50 (reviewing academic literature from 
economics, psychology, and cultural studies on entrepreneurship). 
 116.  Pozen, supra note 103, at 287. 
 117.  Id. at 291-92; Licht, supra note 63, at 823. 
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that market risk pertains to recurring events against which companies take 
out insurance.118  In Knight’s view, though, the entrepreneur is uniquely 
willing to bear “uncertainty,” or unknown future events that are 
uninsurable, unpredictable, and derive from the process of discovering 
ever-changing market demands.119 
But Joseph Schumpeter is perhaps the economist (and lawyer)120 who 
most prominently and memorably explained capitalism in terms of the 
entrepreneur’s role and impact.121  Schumpeter approached economics 
differently than classical economists.122  He disagreed that markets tend 
toward equilibrium and drew attention away from Smith’s “invisible hand” 
metaphor.123  Instead, viewing capitalism as an existential struggle, 
Schumpeter asserted that the natural state of capitalist markets is 
competitive upheaval.124 
Schumpeter argued that 
in capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, 
. . .the competition [that counts is] from the new commodity, the 
new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of 
organization . . . —competition which . . . strikes not at the 
margins of . . . existing firms but at their foundations and their 
very lives . . . [A] theoretical construction which neglects this 
essential element. . .neglects all that is most typically capitalist 
 
 118.  Pozen, supra note 103, at 291-92; Licht, supra note 63, at 823. 
 119.  Pozen, supra note 103, at 291-92; Licht, supra note 63, at 823. 
 120.  See McCraw, supra note 5, at 60-62 (describing Schumpeter’s brief but successful 
law practice in Cairo); Thomas K. McCraw, Classics: Joseph Schumpeter on Competition, 8 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 194, 221 (2012) (noting that “Schumpeter had been trained at the 
University of Vienna as a lawyer as well as an economist, but he had left the practice of law 
in 1908”). 
 121.  McCraw, supra note 5, at 503-04. 
 122.  Among other differences, Schumpeter viewed capitalism as an evolving process 
through a long-term lens where disequilibrium is the norm, contrasting his perspective with 
those of other economists who, in Schumpeter’s estimation, were too focused on particular 
events or particular points in time where market equilibrium and simplifying assumptions, 
like perfect competition or perfect information, obscured entrepreneurial realities.  See 
Schumpeter, supra note 5, at 84 (arguing that “the problem that is usually being visualized 
is how capitalism administers existing structures, whereas the relevant problem is how it 
creates and destroys them”). 
 123.  See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 5, at 726 (asserting that “Schumpeter, unlike Adam 
Smith, argued that there is no invisible hand directing the forces of the economy toward 
stability and growth”). 
 124.  Arthur, supra note 109, at 10-12; Schumpeter, supra note 5, at 31-32 (“[C]apitalist 
economy is not and cannot be stationary.  Nor is it merely expanding in a steady manner.  It 
is incessantly being revolutionized from within by new enterprise . . . . Economic progress, 
in capitalist society, means turmoil.  And. . .in this turmoil competition works in a manner 
completely different from the way it would work in a stationary process, however perfectly 
competitive.”). 
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about it; . . .it is like Hamlet without the Danish prince.125 
Schumpeter took particular issue with how the classical economic 
assumption of perfect competition failed to account for innovation, noting 
that “[t]he introduction of new methods of production and new 
commodities is hardly conceivable with perfect—and perfectly prompt—
competition from the start.  And this means that the bulk of what we call 
economic progress is incompatible with” the classical economic 
assumption of perfect competition.126  That is, innovation is by nature new 
and different; thus, perfect competition is impossible when radical, 
unexpected, game-changing, paradigm-shifting innovation occurs.127  And 
if innovation is the primary catalyst of a capitalist economy, then an 
economic model that assumes away the catalyst of the system has 
grievously distorted the reality it claims to represent. 
Schumpeter thus places innovation at the center of economics, 
describing capitalism as “industrial mutation . . . that incessantly 
revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying 
the old one, incessantly creating a new one.  This process of Creative 
Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.”128  Through 
technological progress, innovative competitors continually threaten to 
overtake and destroy industry leaders.129  And when status-quo market 
leaders fall and are replaced due to competitors’ new technology or 
innovative business models, Schumpeter termed the process creative 
destruction.130 
For Schumpeter, creative destruction is the disruptive dynamism and 
energy behind capitalist economies, where innovative creations continually 
challenge and destroy existing businesses, sometimes breaking laws in the 
process.131  From the perspective of creative destruction, economies do “not 
 
 125.  Schumpeter, supra note 5, at 84-86. 
 126.  Id. at 105 (“As a matter of fact, perfect competition is and always has been 
temporarily suspended whenever anything new is being introduced . . . .”). 
 127.  Id. at 106. 
 128.  Id. at 83. 
 129.  Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, “Schumpeterian” Competition and 
Antitrust Policy in High-Tech Markets, 14 COMPETITION 47, 49 (2005) (explaining that “[a]t 
the heart of the Schumpeterian argument” is that “firms do not compete simultaneously for a 
share of the market, but rather sequentially for the market as a whole”); Eyal-Cohen, supra 
note 5, at 726 (noting that for Schumpeter, entrepreneurs’ “innovative new combinations 
destroy the basis of the old economy”). 
 130.  Schumpeter, supra note 5, at 83. 
 131.  Schumpeter described the entrepreneur’s role in capitalist society as follows: 
“Without innovations, no entrepreneurs; without entrepreneurial achievement, no capitalist 
returns and no capitalist propulsion.  The atmosphere of industrial revolutions—of 
‘progress’—is the only one in which capitalism can survive.”  McCraw, supra note 5, at 1, 
citing Joseph Schumpeter, BUSINESS CYCLES: A THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL AND STATISTICAL 
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tend naturally toward stability and growth through the workings of an 
invisible hand, but rather . . . [they are] propelled forward in sudden leaps 
by the endogenous innovations of key entrepreneurs.”132  In creative 
destruction, entrepreneurs are seen as the principle agents of change—“the 
pivot on which everything turns”133—indeed, even as revolutionaries.134 
Later scholars have extended and refined Schumpeter’s approach.135  
For instance, Israel Kirzner envisions the entrepreneur’s primary 
characteristic as “alertness” to opportunities that others fail to appreciate.136  
Kirzner follows Schumpeter in concluding that “[o]pportunities for 
entrepreneurial profit only exist in disequilibrium”; therefore, from an 
entrepreneurial perspective, the usefulness of the classical economic 
assumption of “perfect knowledge [that] exists in a state of equilibrium” is 
highly suspect because of its disconnect from the reality of 
entrepreneurship.137  In addition, William Baumol expands Schumpeter’s 
conception of innovation to include any economic activity performed in a 
novel way.138 
Finally, a particularly influential contribution to entrepreneurship 
research stems from Clayton Christenson’s work on disruptive innovation 
that propels the process of creative destruction.139  Christenson contrasted 
“sustaining innovations” with “disruptive innovations” and tied the latter 
directly to creative destruction.140  He found that existing market leaders 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE CAPITALIST PROCESS 1033 (McGraw-Hill 1939). 
 132.  Pozen, supra note 103, at 291. 
 133.  McCraw, supra note 5, at 7, citing Joseph Schumpeter, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 555 (Oxford Univ. Press 1954). 
 134.  Hobbs, supra note 6, at 285; Pozen, supra note 103, at 291.  See Schumpeter, supra 
note 5, at 132 (arguing that “the function of entrepreneurs is to . . . revolutionize the pattern 
of production by exploiting an invention or, more generally, an untried technological 
possibility for producing a new commodity or producing an old one in a new way, by 
opening up a new source of supply of materials or a new outlet for products, by reorganizing 
an industry and so on”). 
 135.  See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 5, at 730-37 (reviewing contemporary scholars’ 
additions to Schumpeter’s framework). 
 136.  Pozen, supra note 103, at 292-93; Licht, supra note 63, at 823-24; Eyal-Cohen, 
supra note 5, at 733-34. 
 137.  Eyal-Cohen, supra note 5, at 733. 
 138.  Pozen, supra note 103, at 293; Eyal-Cohen, supra note 5, at 731-33. 
 139.  Christenson, supra note 4, at 46-48.  See also Richard N. Foster, INNOVATION: THE 
ATTACKER’S ADVANTAGE (Summit Books 1988) (arguing that “technological 
discontinuities” help explain how start-up companies overtake established firms); THOMAS 
KUHN, STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3rd ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1996) 
(1962) (explaining “paradigm shifts” as the method of scientific progress advancing through 
revolutionary leaps in understanding, not linear steps in incremental knowledge). 
 140.  See Christenson, supra note 4, at xxxiv of Preface (agreeing with a co-researcher 
that “disruptive technology is probably the cause behind the ‘creative destruction’ that 
economist Joseph Schumpeter observed to be the primary engine of economic progress”). 
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often successfully accomplish sustaining innovations, or incremental and 
marginal improvements on existing products.141  But Christenson 
demonstrated that start-up entrepreneurs with new technologies, or “new 
product architectures involving little new technology per se,”142 are 
frequently better positioned than existing market leaders to carry out 
disruptive innovations, which create new markets and eventually destroy 
old ones.143 
For example, in the disk drive industry, Christenson found that 
established companies consistently led new entrants in developing ever 
faster disk drives with ever increasing storage capacity.144  Similarly, in the 
heavy-equipment industry, new entrants rarely threatened market-leading 
manufacturers of earth excavators that used a cable pulley system.145  As 
long as the underlying technology and product architecture remained 
constant, even with continuous marginal improvements (sustaining 
innovations), industry leaders successfully fended off new entrants.146  In 
both examples, though, new entrants did eventually dethrone industry 
leaders.147  But they did so only by developing new technology or new 
product architectures (smaller disk drives and hydraulic excavators) that 
eventually made the technology of the industry leaders obsolete (larger disk 
drives and cable pulley excavators).148  Disruptive innovation thus propels 
 
 141.  Id. at 46 (noting that in Christenson’s data set “there was not a single example . . . 
of an entrant firm leading the industry or securing a viable market position with a sustaining 
innovation”). 
 142.  Id. at 62. 
 143.  Id. at 48-54.  Schumpeter envisioned both start-up firms and large companies as 
driving forces behind disruptive innovation. See McCraw, supra note 5, at 215 (describing 
Schumpeter’s discussion of innovation driven by new firms and existing firms).  Particularly 
in the context of technological change “where the new methods of production are embodied 
in new industries,” Schumpeter recognized what Christenson investigated empirically: that 
new entrants, not existing market leaders, are often the ones to found new industries.  See 
Schumpeter, supra note 5, at 119 (concluding that “obviously the automobile plants were 
not financed from the depreciation accounts of railroads”); McCraw, supra note 5, at 74 
(observing that “Schumpeter especially emphasizes the role of new companies in making 
innovations that interrupt” existing markets). 
 144.  See Christenson, supra note 4, at 46-54 (describing how industry leaders 
maintained a market dominant position so long as standard disk drive product architecture 
remained at 5.25-inch drives, but new entrants replaced market leaders by developing a new 
product architecture in the form of a 3.5-inch disk drive). 
 145.  See id. at 69 (explaining that even as the power source for excavator engines 
progressed from steam-power to gasoline to diesel to electric, market leaders maintained 
their dominant position, but once the underlying product architecture of the cable pulley 
system was replaced by a hydraulic system, new entrants successfully unseated established 
companies to become the new market leaders). 
 146.  Id. at 46, 69-72. 
 147.  Id. at 46-54, 72-81. 
 148.  Id. 
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and explains creative destruction. 
From the perspectives of entrepreneurship scholars, then, the essence 
of entrepreneurship is not business transactions leading to market 
equilibrium.  It is instead the ever-evolving world of creative destruction 
where disruptive innovations threaten the very existence of market leading 
companies.  Extending the economic principles into law, the crux of the 
intersection of law and entrepreneurship can be viewed as the legal 
conflicts that creative destructive business models encounter.  The primary 
theoretical tool of the law and entrepreneurship field should not come from 
the assumptions of classical economic theory that have little or no place for 
the entrepreneur.  Instead, the theoretical tools of law and entrepreneurship 
should arise from economic theories that place preeminent importance on 
the entrepreneur, such as creative destruction and its accompanying 
disruptive innovations. 
III. CREATIVE DESTRUCTIVE LEGAL CONFLICT 
This article proposes creative destruction as more than solely an 
economic explanation of entrepreneurship.  Creative destruction should 
also serve as the organizing principle of the jurisprudence of law and 
entrepreneurship.  Despite the prevalent link between creative destruction 
as a business phenomenon and creative destruction as a legal phenomenon, 
no unified jurisprudence of creative destruction exists.  The jurisprudential 
core of law and entrepreneurship is the creative destructive moment (or 
moments) in some entrepreneurial firms’ growth cycles when a disruptive 
innovation encounters legal conflict, whether that conflict occurs in court 
or outside of court.  Those moments encapsulate the law of 
entrepreneurship. 
Creative destruction is a high stakes battle.149  Market leaders do not 
go down quietly, and rising innovators do not arrive politely.150  Market 
revolutions are bloody, whether figuratively or sometimes even literally (as 
in the case of the Uber protests in Paris).  As such, legal conflict frequently 
is at the core of creative destruction.151 
And though the battleground for creative destructive legal conflict is 
often traditional litigation, the law of entrepreneurship also includes the 
conflicts that occur outside the courtroom.  For instance, creative 
 
 149.  SCHUMPETER, supra note 5, at 84-86.  
 150.  Id. at 96 (noting that market leaders “can in various ways fight the threatening 
attack . . . that is to say, they can and will fight progress itself”). 
 151.  Id. at 132-133 (“The resistance which comes from interests threatened by an 
innovation in the productive process is not likely to die out as long as the capitalist order 
persists.”). 
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destructive legal conflict encompasses pre-litigation positioning and 
governmental and industry lobbying designed to smooth the path for 
disruptive innovations.  Even further, creative destructive legal conflict also 
entails public relations advocacy, social media strategy, and advertising 
targeted at swaying public opinion.  The “jurisprudence” of law and 
entrepreneurship is thus significantly broader than solely litigated cases; it 
includes the full panoply of legal conflicts that creative destructive 
entrepreneurs encounter outside of court.  As discussed below, disruption 
framers deploy a host of legal strategies to confront all manner of legal 
conflict that creative destructive entrepreneurs encounter. 
As described in Part I, creative destructive legal conflict has received 
little systematic attention in law and entrepreneurship scholarship, for at 
least two reasons.  First, the predominant focus on business transactions 
that has been at the vanguard of the law and entrepreneurship field tends to 
sideline creative destructive legal conflict because it concentrates on 
attending to entrepreneurs’ transactional needs.152  Second, jurisprudential 
analyses typically153 conform to doctrinal boundaries that legal disciplines 
necessarily impose on their subject: antitrust jurisprudence considers 
antitrust cases just as intellectual property or securities jurisprudence 
evaluates the laws underlying their respective legal disciplines. 
But doctrinal categorization ignores the motivating cause of the legal 
conflict: creative destruction through disruptive innovation.  Of course, 
some doctrinal legal analyses helpfully apply a creative destructive 
paradigm to jurisprudential research within an established legal discipline, 
such as patent, copyright, or antitrust law.154  But law and entrepreneurship 
scholarship should consolidate the dispersed examples to develop a holistic 
and systematic, instead of scattered and piecemeal, jurisprudence of 
creative destruction, including legal conflict both inside and outside of 
 
 152.  E.g., Malloy, supra note 112, at 1107 (“In developing an understanding of the 
relationship among property law, real estate transactions, and entrepreneurship, it is 
important to understand that this analysis is from the perspective of transactional law 
theory.”). 
 153.  For the law and entrepreneurship field, an important exception to the typical 
disciplinary approach is Smith and Ueda’s adaptability hypothesis, described in Part I.C. 
 154.  E.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 98 (considering how Schumpeter’s work applies to 
antitrust laws); Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic 
Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 844-45 (1988) (adopting an explicitly 
“Schumpeterian framework for its analysis” of patent laws); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The 
Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 268 (2002) (arguing that “file sharing enabled by digital technology 
. . . is not theft” but instead is creative destruction of copyright law); Raymond Shih Ray 
Ku, Consumers and Creative Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market Failure, 18 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 539, 564-74 (2003) (interpreting court decisions on the fair use exception in 
copyright law through a creative destructive lens).  
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court. 
The examples highlighted below do not fit a transactional model of 
law and entrepreneurship because they have nothing to do with business 
deals.  The entrepreneurial companies are not in need of transaction cost 
engineers, regulatory arbitrageurs, reputational intermediaries, enterprise 
architects, or any other transactional service provider.  Creative destructive 
entrepreneurs need disruption framers to provide strategic counsel through 
the legal conflict that accompanies entrepreneurship, as Part IV explains. 
A. Tesla 
A prominent recent example of creative destructive legal conflict is 
Tesla, an innovative manufacturer of electric cars.155  Tesla sells new cars 
directly to consumers, both over the Internet and through company-owned 
showrooms.156  Though such direct sales practices are commonplace in 
most industries, direct sales of automobiles violate some states’ franchise 
and car dealership laws, many of which were initially established when 
Ford’s Model-T was cutting-edge technology.157  In Texas, for instance, 
legal obstacles have caused the seemingly ludicrous situation of Tesla 
being permitted to display its cars in showrooms so long as the price of the 
cars remains a secret and no test drives occur.158  In other states, Tesla has 
been barred from even operating a showroom because the company refuses 
to sell its cars through a middleman.159 
On the surface, Tesla’s legal conflict revolves primarily around the 
 
 155.  TESLA MOTORS, http://www.teslamotors.com [https://perma.cc/4WVQ-7CA6] (last 
visited May 29, 2015). 
 156.  Find Us, TESLA MOTORS, http://www.teslamotors.com/findus#/ 
[https://perma.cc/37SJ-WGYV] (last visited May 29, 2015). 
 157.  Mike Ramsey & Valerie Bauerlein, Tesla Clashes With Car Dealers, WALL ST. J., 
(June 18, 2013), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324049504578541902814606098 
[https://perma.cc/699F-XCEM]; Mark Rogowsky, After the New Jersey Ban, Here’s Where 
Tesla Can (And Cannot) Sell Its Cars, FORBES, (Mar. 15, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/markrogowsky/2014/03/15/after-the-new-jersey-ban-heres-
where-tesla-can-and-cannot-sell-its-cars/ [https://perma.cc/9UH2-UM9Z]. 
 158.  Marcus Wohlsen, Car Dealers Are Terrified of Tesla’s Plan to Eliminate Oil 
Changes, WIRED, (Mar. 14, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/03/car-dealers-
fear-teslas-plan-end-oil-changes-forever/ [https://perma.cc/M5TQ-PMY6]. 
 159.  Justin Hyde, In Tesla Sales Fight, Automakers Take the Dealers’ Side, YAHOO! 
AUTOS, (Mar. 20, 2014), https://www.yahoo.com/autos/bp/in-tesla-sales-fight—automakers-
take-the-dealers—side-213905585.html [https://perma.cc/7XX3-2MTV]; David Kravets, 
West Virginia is the Latest State to Ban Tesla Direct Sales, ARS TECHNICA, (Apr. 4, 2015, 
1:27 PM), http://arstechnica.com/cars/2015/04/west-virginia-is-the-latest-state-to-ban-tesla-
direct-sales/ [https://perma.cc/5PFV-EQPL]. 
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interpretation of car dealership rules and antitrust law.160  Car dealership 
rules in many states have evolved to prohibit car manufacturers from 
selling cars directly to consumers through factory-owned stores.161  
Dealerships have successfully lobbied state legislatures to ban factory-
owned stores on the grounds that independently owned car dealerships are 
more invested in local communities and would be at a competitive 
disadvantage if manufacturers could bypass dealers and sell directly to 
consumers at wholesale prices.162  Accordingly, as Tesla attempts to sell its 
cars directly to consumers, car dealerships claim that Tesla’s direct sales 
business model is a form of unfair competition.163 
For example, dealership associations in Massachusetts and New York 
argued that it is unfair for Tesla to sell directly to consumers because all 
traditional car manufacturers sell through third-party dealerships.164  In the 
dealerships’ view, Tesla should not be an exception.165  For its part, Tesla 
successfully argued in Massachusetts and New York that it should be free 
to sell cars directly to consumers because Tesla has no independent dealers; 
therefore, it would be impossible for Tesla to undercut a dealership’s prices 
because there are no Tesla dealerships.166  Furthermore, Tesla has 
buttressed its argument with reference to how technologically different 
electric cars are from traditional gas-powered vehicles and how many 
fewer vehicles Tesla sells compared to gas-powered vehicles.167 
Following Tesla’s victories in New York and Massachusetts, however, 
the Michigan legislature took action to preempt a similar result in the 
heartland of traditional U.S. car manufacturers.168  The Michigan dealership 
statute previously stated that a manufacturer could not “sell any new motor 
 
 160.  Matter of Greater N.Y. Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles of the State 
of N.Y. LLC, 969 N.Y.S.2d 721, 724-27 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cnty. 2013). 
 161.  Cynthia Barmore, Tesla Unplugged: Automobile Franchise Laws and the Threat to 
the Electric Vehicle Market, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 185, 192-95 (2014); Rob Schwartz, Note, 
Tesla, Vertical Integration, and Incumbent Legal Disadvantages in the New Car Retailing 
Market, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 567, 579-82 (2014). 
 162.  Mass. State Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. Tesla Motors MA, Inc., 15 N.E.3d. 1152, 1156-
62 (2014). 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id.; N.Y. Auto. Dealers Ass’n, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 724-25. 
 165.  Mass. State Auto. Dealers Ass’n, 15 N.E.3d. at 1156-62; N.Y. Auto. Dealers Ass’n, 
969 N.Y.S.2d at 724-25.   
 166.  Mass. State Auto. Dealers Ass’n, 15 N.E.3d. at 1156-62; N.Y. Auto. Dealers Ass’n, 
969 N.Y.S.2d at 724-25.   
 167.  Mass. State Auto. Dealers Ass’n, 15 N.E.3d. at 1156-62; N.Y. Auto. Dealers Ass’n, 
969 N.Y.S.2d at 724-25.   
 168.  Vince Bond Jr., Tesla’s Sales Limits in Michigan Tightened by One Word of Law, 
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, (Oct. 20, 2014, 8:32 AM)., 
http://www.autonews.com/article/20141020/RETAIL/141029995/teslas-sales-limits-in-
michigan-tightened-by-one-word-of-law [https://perma.cc/D635-D3S4].  
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vehicle directly to a retail customer other than through its franchised 
dealers.”169  But the Michigan legislature voted to delete the word “its.”170  
Without that key word, the statute definitively requires all new motor 
vehicles to be sold through franchised dealers.171  Therefore, the argument 
Tesla used successfully in New York and Massachusetts is much less likely 
to prevail in Michigan.  The fact that Tesla has no franchised dealers will 
not help Tesla avoid application of Michigan’s dealership law to Tesla’s 
business model. 
Regardless of the particularities of state car dealership rules or 
antitrust law, the root of Tesla’s legal conflict is disruptive innovation, 
which is manifested in two related ways.  First, Tesla’s technology for 
manufacturing electric vehicles is a paradigm shift from the technology 
involved in producing gas-powered automobiles.  Second, Tesla’s business 
model for selling and maintaining its cars flies in the face of the way new 
cars have been distributed since the invention of the automobile. 
Tesla’s twin technological and business model disruptive innovations 
are inseparable from each other.  Electric cars have been likened to “an app 
on four wheels,” such that “a Tesla without its outer shell looks like a cell 
phone on wheels.  It’s basically just a big battery.”172  Lacking an internal 
combustion engine—the hallmark of traditional automobiles—Tesla cars 
have “no spark plugs, no air filters, no fuel pumps, no timing belts,” which 
dramatically changes the type of maintenance that Tesla cars require.173  
Tesla updates the software in each car wirelessly and remotely over the 
Internet, and the car’s software automatically detects when new parts, such 
as brake pads or wiper blades, are needed.174  Hence, because electric cars 
are technologically a different product from gas-powered cars, Tesla is 
reluctant to entrust third-party car dealerships with the crucial role of 
promoting and selling a product that not only competes with gas-powered 
vehicles but also undermines car dealerships’ revenue source of fee-for-
service maintenance.175  Consequently, the innovative design of Tesla cars 
goes hand in hand with the company’s strategy of selling and distributing 
cars directly.  And for the automobile industry, a direct sales business 
model is an innovative, disruptive, and even illegal business model. 
 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Wohlsen, supra note 158. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
ARTICLE 3 (WROLDSEN) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/16  9:33 PM 
2016] CREATIVE DESTRUCTIVE LEGAL CONFLICT 765 
 
1. Creative Destructive Analysis of Tesla 
Using creative destruction as the touchstone of legal analysis reveals 
insights that would be missed under existing approaches to law and 
entrepreneurship.  By definition, Tesla’s legal conflict falls outside the 
scope of a transactional paradigm, but law and entrepreneurship should not 
be so limited.  From an economic perspective, the hallmark of Tesla’s 
entrepreneurial efforts is precisely its disruptive innovation, both in terms 
of its technology and its business model.  Indeed, Tesla’s disruptive 
innovation is precisely what leads to its legal conflict; therefore, the law 
and entrepreneurship field should embrace the legal conflict that disruptive 
innovation causes even though it falls categorically outside of transactional 
law. 
Transactional attorneys do play a role in Tesla’s entrepreneurial story.  
For example, transactional attorneys add value by creating a corporate 
structure that utilizes wholly-owned subsidiaries to sell cars in individual 
states, protecting Tesla’s intellectual property, and counseling the company 
on selling stock in capital markets, among countless other areas.  But once 
legal conflict arises, the contributions of the transactional approach 
typically cease.  In legal scholarship, transactional theories are irrelevant to 
the legal conflict that entrepreneurs encounter.  Similarly, in law practice, 
once a transactional matter enters a stage of legal conflict, large law firms 
pass the client from the corporate transactional group to a new set of 
lawyers in the litigation practice area.  Law school clinics, too, are likewise 
bifurcated between transactional and litigation services.176 
But the fact that legal skill sets require different attorneys to specialize 
in different areas is not a good reason for the law and entrepreneurship field 
to ignore Tesla’s creative destructive legal conflict, which encompasses 
more than just litigation.  Once the analytical lens of law and 
entrepreneurship expands to include legal conflict, it becomes immediately 
apparent that the key function for lawyers who counsel creative destructive 
entrepreneurs is to prepare and execute a comprehensive strategy for 
creative destructive legal conflict.  For instance, beyond litigation, a key 
component of Tesla’s creative destructive legal strategy involves social 
media,177 lobbying,178 and community mobilization among Tesla 
 
 176.  In a law school clinical setting, transactional clinics typically do not represent a 
client on matters that enter litigation.  In an ideal scenario, a different clinic, such as the law 
school’s civil litigation clinic, can assume representation.  But seamless cooperation on 
client matters in the clinical environment is challenging because each clinic typically has its 
own wait list for potential new clients. 
 177.  For example, Tesla’s CEO has often taken to Twitter and other forms of social 
media to further Tesla’s legal arguments.  Ann Charles, 4 Social Media Secrets You Can 
Learn From Elon Musk, FAST COMPANY (May 19, 2014), 
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supporters.179 
These activities, like litigation, also fall outside the standard 
transactional account of entrepreneurship.  One of Tesla’s particularly 
effective lobbying strategies was to offer test drives to North Carolina 
legislators in an effort to fend off a new law that would have prohibited 
online sales of automobiles.180  Legislators were impressed, and the new 
anti-Tesla measure never came up for a vote.181  In view of the diverse 
strategic legal counsel that creative destructive legal conflict demands 
(beyond transactional advice), lawyers who counsel creative destructive 
entrepreneurs are more holistically conceived of as disruption framers, not 
transaction cost engineers, as further described in the examples that follow 
and in Part IV. 
To develop legal strategy for entrepreneurs, disruption framers need 
unique skills that should be cultivated from a unified body of creative 
 
http://www.fastcompany.com/3030697/bottom-line/4-secrets-teslas-ceo-and-other-leaders-
teach-us-about-being-social-media-savvy [https://perma.cc/DE52-4T2M]; Peter Delevett & 
Dana Hull, 2013: Tesla’s Media Strategy: Build A Brand Without Spending On Advertising, 
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (April 7, 2013), 
http://www.mercurynews.com/business/ci_22976857/teslas-media-strategy-build-brand-
without-spending-advertising [https://perma.cc/2UXV-FXFK].  For additional discussion of 
Tesla’s social media strategy, see David Orozco, The Use of Legal Crowdsourcing 
(“Lawsourcing”) to Achieve Legal, Regulatory, and Policy Objectives, 53 AM. BUS. L. J. 
145, 163-64 (2016). 
 178.  Tesla’s lobbying activities have increased as it continues to seek state laws that 
accommodate its direct sales business model.  See, e.g., Dana Hull, et al., Tesla Takes On 
The Dealerships – And GM, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 3, 2016), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-03/tesla-takes-on-the-dealerships-and-
gm [https://perma.cc/N5NP-HPLN ] (describing successful efforts to derail an Indiana law 
that would have required Tesla to operate through a third-party dealership); Hugh R. 
Morley, Top Businesses, Trade Groups Spent $5.5M on Lobbying in NJ in 2014, 
NORTHJERSEY (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.northjersey.com/news/business/where-business-
lobbyists-put-their-cash-1.1287523?page=all [https://perma.cc/E66W-VAT7 ] (detailing 
notable expenditures of business and trade-group lobbyists in 2014); David Saleh Rauf & 
Neal Morton, Tesla Gears Up for Texas Lobbying Blitz, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, (Dec. 
18, 2014), http://www.expressnews.com/news/local/article/Tesla-gears-up-for-Texas-
lobbying-blitz-5967219.php [https://perma.cc/RHP6-ENPR ] (discussing Tesla’s Texas 
lobbying strategy). 
 179.  Tamara Walsh, Tesla’s Cult-Like Following is Starting to Resemble Apple’s, 
BUSINESS INSIDER, (Sept. 2 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/teslas-cult-like-fans-
resemble-apples-2014-9 [https://perma.cc/F37E-HN99].  Tesla’s website includes numerous 
points of engagement for its supporters to help further Tesla’s legal advocacy.  Forums, 
TESLA MOTORS, http://my.teslamotors.com/forum/forums/tesla-advocacy-web-site 
[https://perma.cc/HM6L-SBWH ] (last visited June 26, 2015). 
 180.  Julie Bykowicz & Angela Greiling Keane, Tesla Woos Car-Guy Lawmakers to 
Counter Dealers’ Cash, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS, (Nov. 26, 2013), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-11-26/tesla-woos-car-guys-with-rides-to-
counter-dealers-cash [https://perma.cc/24SP-AXRA]. 
 181.  Id. 
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destructive legal conflict.  Without a unified framework of creative 
destructive legal conflict, Tesla’s legal disputes simply fall under the two 
unrelated categories of state regulations of car dealerships and antitrust law.  
The former is too limiting and the latter is too narrow.  Focusing the 
analysis on state regulations misses the more universal and generalizable 
theme of disruptive innovation, which occurs in many more contexts 
beyond state regulations.  And housing Tesla’s legal conflict under antitrust 
law prioritizes one aspect of the dispute (namely, allegations of unfair 
competition)182 but avoids connections to other cases of creative destructive 
legal conflict where antitrust law is not central.  Even in Tesla’s case, the 
legal strategy goes beyond antitrust law: Tesla has considered seeking 
federal legislation under the commerce clause that would facilitate Tesla’s 
direct sales model nationwide.183  Tesla’s legal strategy thus involves 
constitutional law, which demonstrates that antitrust law is insufficient to 
capture even the full range of Tesla’s creative destructive legal conflict, not 
to mention the creative destructive legal conflict that other entrepreneurial 
firms encounter, as the examples below further demonstrate. 
Instead of forcing Tesla’s legal conflict into existing disciplinary 
categories, this article suggests using the underlying economic driver of 
Tesla’s legal conflict (creative destruction) as the organizing principle of 
jurisprudential analysis.  And whereas innovation law and policy tends to 
emphasize antitrust and intellectual property law, this article’s proposed 
framework would cross all legal disciplinary lines in an effort to unite 
creative destructive legal conflict as an economic and business 
phenomenon, irrespective of legal categories.  Whether viewed as an 
expansion of innovation law or of the law and entrepreneurship field, then, 
this article’s substantive proposal is to unify and organize all creative 
destructive legal conflict as one coherent body, in order to provide 
disruption framers with the strategic tools they need to advise creative 
destructive entrepreneurs. 
B. Uber 
Another prime contemporary example of creative destructive legal 
conflict is Uber.  Whereas traditionally people would hail a taxi cab on the 
street, Uber relies on an Internet app that allows riders and drivers to 
 
 182.  N. Y. Auto. Dealers Ass’n, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 724-27. 
 183.  Ramsey & Bauerlein, supra note 157, at 3 (describing Tesla’s interest in “a federal 
legal challenge based on limits to interstate commerce” and “new [federal] legislation in 
Congress”).  For a discussion of commerce clause jurisprudence in the context of car 
dealerships, see Barmore, supra note 161, at 211-13, and Schwartz, supra note 161, at 574-
79. 
ARTICLE 3 (WROLDSEN) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/16  9:33 PM 
768 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:3 
 
schedule a pickup electronically.184  And whereas traditional taxi services 
are highly regulated enterprises with government-licensed cars and full-
time drivers, Uber leverages part-time drivers who use their own cars so 
that practically anyone with a car and spare time can make extra money as 
an Uber driver.185 
From a business perspective, Uber’s successful results are undeniable.  
After operating for less than four years in New York, there are already 
more cars affiliated with Uber on the streets of New York City than there 
are taxi cabs.186  Uber was valued near $51 billion in its most recent 
investment round, tying Facebook as the highest-valued venture-backed 
company in history and achieving the $50 billion milestone two years faster 
than Facebook.187  Uber is currently the highest-valued venture-backed 
company in the US by a margin of some $40 billion.188  Uber has won all 
kinds of awards and recognition in the entrepreneurial community,189 and 
though Uber is more prominent than its competitors, it is far from alone in 
the electronic ride-hailing market.190  Outside of ride-hailing, other 
companies in the so-called “sharing economy”191 are also challenging legal 
rules with their innovative business models, such as car-sharing firms like 
FlightCar and Turo (formerly called RelayRides),192 and home-sharing 
 
 184.  Boston Cab Dispatch, Inc. v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Civ. Action No. 13-10769-
NMG, 2015 WL 314131, at *1-2 (D. Mass. Jan. 26, 2015). 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Melkorka Licea, Elizabeth Ruby & Rebecca Harshbarger, More Uber Cars Than 
Yellow Taxis on the Road in NYC, N.Y. POST, Mar. 17, 2015, 
http://nypost.com/2015/03/17/more-uber-cars-than-yellow-taxis-on-the-road-in-nyc/ 
[https://perma.cc/8CR5-KKXZ]. 
 187.  Douglas MacMillan & Telis Demos, Uber Valued at More than $50 Billion, WALL 
ST. J., July 31, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-valued-at-more-than-50-billion-
1438367457 [https://perma.cc/BG4Z-3LQZ]. 
 188.  Douglas MacMillan, Sam Schechner & Lisa Fleisher, Uber Snags $41 Billion 
Valuation, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/ubers-new-funding-
values-it-at-over-41-billion-1417715938 [https://perma.cc/B9F8-7MSF]. 
 189.  For instance, Uber took home the prestigious Crunchie award for Best Overall 
Startup in 2014.  Matthew Panzarino & Alexia Tsotsis, Uber Wins the 2014 Crunchie for 
Best Overall Startup, TECHCRUNCH, http://techcrunch.com/2015/02/05/uber-wins-the-2014-
crunchie-for-best-overall-startup/ [https://perma.cc/67NU-D2LB] (last updated Feb. 5, 
2015). 
 190.  Lyft and Sidecar are Uber’s most prominent competitors in the US; Hailo and Gett 
in Europe; and Kuaidi Dache and Didi Dache (which have merged into one company but 
operate with different names) in China.  
 191.  See Ranchordás, supra note 67, at 417-21, 455-74 (discussing regulatory concerns 
in the sharing economy, especially in relation to Uber and Airbnb). 
 192.  Companies like FlightCar and Turo allow departing airline travelers to rent their 
vehicles to arriving airline travelers, instead of paying to park at the airport.  Competitors 
(such as traditional car rental companies) and government officials (such as airport 
regulators) allege that the car-sharing business models constitute unfair competition and 
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platforms like Airbnb.193 
From a legal perspective, though, Uber is a poster child for creative 
destructive legal conflict.  Chronicling “Uber’s ongoing legal struggles,” 
one commentator observes that “Uber is good at two things: running a taxi 
service and getting on regulators’ nerves.  The car service’s entire history 
has been a series of back and forth battles between it and the cities that it’s 
trying to operate in, with Uber frequently ignoring regulations when 
launching in a new location.”194  Indeed, as regulators grapple with how to 
handle Uber’s business model, traditional taxi cab services continue to 
resist Uber’s presence—Parisian taxi drivers refer to Uber’s business 
practices as “economic terrorism”—and actively defend their turf through 
litigation.195 
The litigation over Uber’s business model involves numerous legal 
disciplines.196  For instance, as a leading company in the sharing economy, 
Uber’s business model, which classifies drivers as independent contractors 
instead of employees, has been under attack in court for potential violations 
 
violate transportation laws, airport rules, and licensing requirements. 
 193.  Airbnb and VacationRentals provide an Internet platform for individuals to rent 
real estate, generally for short stays.  Competitors (such as hotels) and regulators have 
challenged the peer-to-peer sharing business model on grounds that it violates occupancy 
rules.  See, e.g., Kathleen Doler, Renting Out: Airbnb Shows Pro and Con for Homeowners, 
INVESTORS’ BUS. DAILY, June 18, 2015, http://news.investors.com/061815-757971-some-
cities-balk-at-short-term-vacation-rentals-like-airbnb.htm?ven=djcp&src=aurlabo 
[https://perma.cc/5T4T-DGX9] (discussing legal restrictions on Airbnb’s business model); 
Will Coldwell, Airbnb’s Legal Troubles: What Are the Issues?, THE GUARDIAN, July 8, 
2014, http://www.theguardian.com/travel/2014/jul/08/airbnb-legal-troubles-what-are-the-
issues [https://perma.cc/VE6K-WHH5] (highlighting Airbnb’s legal obstacles from an 
international perspective). 
 194.  See also Daniel Roberts, A Brief History of Uber Scandals, YAHOO FINANCE (Feb. 
22, 2016), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/uber-scandals-timeline-michigan-shooting-
140035801.html# [https://perma.cc/UE59-KAEE] (summarizing numerous legal conflicts 
involving Uber); Jacob Kastrenakes, Uber’s Bumpy Road to World Domination, THE 
VERGE, http://www.theverge.com/2014/12/15/7393693/uber-fights-to-expand-across-the-
globe-storystream [https://perma.cc/5ZLN-683F] (last updated Feb. 1, 2016).  Far from 
condemning Uber’s confrontational strategy, the commentator recognizes that “[f]or the 
most part, . . . [Uber’s] strategy has been successful.  Major cities have reworked their taxi 
laws to account for Uber, as well as other services like it.  But for every success, Uber 
seems to run into a new hurdle in another city or with another type of service.”  Id.  
 195.  Rubin & Scott, supra note 1, at 1. 
 196.  Apart from creative destructive legal conflict stemming from the innovative ride-
sharing business model itself, Uber also faces legal action related to an Uber driver’s sexual 
assault on a passenger and improper handling of driver tips, among other legal disputes.  
See, e.g., Dan Levine & Edwin Chan, Uber, Lyft Rebuffed in Bids to Deem Drivers 
Independent Contractors, REUTERS, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/12/lyft-drivers-
idUSL1N0WD2T520150312 [https://perma.cc/RJ5G-N9MA] (last updated Mar. 11, 2015 
11:21 PM). 
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of employment laws.197  Uber is also facing legal action from traditional 
taxi and limousine companies that see Uber as a competitive threat.  These 
plaintiffs allege that Uber is engaged in unfair competition as an unlicensed 
taxi company198 that avoids expenses such as medallion fees, which can be 
in the hundreds of thousands of dollars for each licensed taxi cab.199  
Additionally, state and local government regulators challenge Uber’s 
compliance with a host of transportation and taxi regulations, such as 
insurance coverage minimums,200 driver background checks,201 and vehicle 
safety inspections.202  Airports refuse to allow Uber drivers to pick up 
travelers, or force them to meet in less convenient locations, because Uber 
does not pay airport licensing fees.203  In France, Uber’s litigation is a 
constitutional law question,204 and Uber has been barred from operating, at 
one time or another, in several European countries, South Korea, India, and 
Thailand.205 
1. Creative Destructive Analysis of Uber 
Uber is one the most prominent recent entrepreneurial success stories, 
and legal conflicts (not transactional legal issues) are a central theme of the 
company’s growth.  Uber’s strategy has consistently been to enter new 
 
 197.  Douglas O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 
1069092, at *1-4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2015). 
 198.  United Independent Taxi Drivers v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. BC513879, 2013 
WL 3545872 (Cal. Super. July 2, 2013). 
 199.  Josh Barro, New York’s Taxi Medallion Prices Fall Again, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/03/upshot/new-york-taxi-medallion-prices-fall-
again.html?abt=0002&abg=1 [https://perma.cc/T2MX-VFXG]. 
 200.  Jennie Davis, Note, Drive At Your Own Risk: Uber Violates Unfair Competition 
Laws by Misleading UberX Drivers about Their Insurance Coverage, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1097, 
1107-10 (2015). 
 201.  Boston Cab Dispatch, 2015 WL 314131, at *1-2. 
 202.  Brian Fitzgerald, Uber Suspends Operations in Nevada, WALL ST. J., Nov.  27, 
2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/11/28/uber-suspends-operations-in-nevada/ 
[https://perma.cc/8ERX-YJAK]. 
 203.  Mike Tierney, Uber Closes in on Its Last Frontier: Airports, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 
2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/business/uber-closes-in-on-its-last-frontier-
airports.html [https://perma.cc/8JP7-FA97]. 
 204.  Sam Schechner, Uber Wins French Court Reprieve Over Legality of Low-Cost 
Service, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-wins-french-court-
reprieve-over-legality-of-low-cost-service-1427794312 [https://perma.cc/NM9Y-TXRX]. 
 205.  Hayley Richardson, Uber Fighting Back in Europe, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 3, 2015, 
http://europe.newsweek.com/uber-fighting-back-europe-319342 [https://perma.cc/Y2TS-
S5BP]; Newley Purnell, Uber Faces Scrutiny From Southeast Asia Regulators, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 3, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-faces-scrutiny-from-southeast-asia-
regulators-1417603194 [https://perma.cc/R24C-8PCF]. 
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markets without asking for regulatory approval or permission.206  By the 
time legal challenges from competitors or regulators come, Uber aims to be 
firmly established in the market with a loyal cadre of drivers and 
passengers.  As such, a vital part of Uber’s legal strategy, in addition to 
litigation, is public relations and lobbying to influence public opinion 
related to the acceptability of ride-hailing apps.  Uber prioritizes business 
growth and addresses legal conflict ex post, not ex ante. 
Transactional legal advice, in contrast, typically seeks to prevent and 
avoid legal conflict, and it is commonly said that venture capitalists will not 
invest in litigation, which makes intuitive sense.  Logically, entrepreneurial 
companies that must overcome legal obstacles might be less attractive 
investments due to the increased cost and uncertainty that litigation poses.  
But Uber is a magnet for both historic sums of venture capital investment, 
as well as frequent and extensive litigation over its business model.  So the 
fact that a highly successful venture-backed entrepreneurial firm is 
enmeshed in numerous legal disputes about the very legality of its 
innovative business model forces a re-examination of the transactional 
account of law and entrepreneurship.  A law and entrepreneurship analysis 
that probes and explains Uber’s seemingly contradictory situation should 
yield helpful insights for future entrepreneurs and the disruption framers 
who counsel them.  A comprehensive theory of creative destructive legal 
conflict is necessary, if the law and entrepreneurship field is to represent 
the diverse reality of disruptive innovation, instead of a mere transactional 
snapshot of entrepreneurship. 
Uber’s creative destructive legal strategy appears to be working, 
though not without significant continuing opposition.207  For instance, the 
mayor of New York City, Bill de Blasio, pushed a bill that would cap the 
number of Uber drivers allowed in the city, prompting Uber, in its 
characteristically provocative way, to add a “fake feature” to its app: when 
users clicked on “de Blasio mode,” the app displayed “no cars available” in 
protest against de Blasio’s proposed regulations.208  Uber’s “blitzkrieg 
strategy,” which also included television advertisements and other public 
 
 206.  Josh Lowensohn, Uber Launches in Portland, Oregon Despite Being Completely 
Illegal There, THE VERGE, http://www.theverge.com/2014/12/5/7342981/uber-launches-in-
portland-oregon-despite-being-completely-illegal-there [https://perma.cc/XH28-VR2R] (last 
updated Dec. 5, 2014 9:29 PM). 
 207.  Nicole Dungca, Even as Uber, Lyft Gain Riders, Drivers Face $500 City Fines, 
BOSTON GLOBE, May 27, 2015, http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/05/26/even-uber-
and-lyft-become-ubiquitous-boston-police-tickets-them-for-being-
illegal/AntttSe6sBJ64nqIsKhU9K/story.html [https://perma.cc/WG8L-H2DR]. 
 208.  Issie Lapowsky, Uber’s New Fake Feature in NYC Derides Regulators, WIRED, 
http://www.wired.com/2015/07/uber-de-blasio/ [https://perma.cc/Z6V9-KJ2C] (last updated 
July 15, 2015 2:55 PM). 
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and private lobbying efforts, forced the New York mayor to withdraw the 
proposed limits on Uber’s activity.209  Another creative destructive business 
in the sharing economy, Airbnb, deployed similar advertising and public 
relations strategies to defeat a California measure designed to restrict 
Airbnb’s emerging business model.210 
Gradually, regulatory bodies are beginning to accommodate Uber’s 
business model, with the California Public Utilities Commission having 
been the first.211  Colorado was the first to legislatively provide for  
“[t]ransportation [n]etwork [c]ompanies,” such as Uber and its competitors, 
even though initially Colorado regulators resisted Uber’s business model.212  
And other jurisdictions continue to make similar adjustments to eliminate 
gray areas in the law and affirmatively regulate Uber’s business model.213 
A creative destructive approach to law and entrepreneurship is useful 
because it uniquely captures and explains Uber’s legal conflicts in a way in 
which existing disciplinary paradigms fail.  Similarly, conceiving of 
lawyers who counsel Uber through its creative destructive legal conflicts as 
disruption framers—not as transaction cost engineers, lobbyists, or generic 
civil litigators—underscores attorneys’ unique roles in developing legal 
strategy to guide entrepreneurial firms through the legal conflict that so 
often accompanies disruptive innovation.  For instance, in response to a 
government crackdown against Uber in Hong Kong, Uber launched an 
 
 209.  Ross Barkan, Why Did Uber Beat Bill de Blasio, OBSERVER, July  27, 2015, 
http://observer.com/2015/07/why-did-uber-beat-bill-de-blasio/ [https://perma.cc/8S5M-
UU5Q].  
 210.  Biz Carson, Airbnb Is Fighting a Critical War in its Own Backyard this Week, BUS. 
INSIDER, http://www.businessinsider.com/airbnb-fights-prop-f-in-san-francisco-2015-10 
[https://perma.cc/U59K-WHGK] (last updated Nov. 3, 2015 5:24 PM); Elizabeth Weise, 
San Francisco Rejects Anti-Airbnb Measure, USA TODAY, Nov. 4, 2015, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/11/04/anti-airbnb-measure-fails-san-
francisco/75138092/ [https://perma.cc/9QTL-RKVL].  Airbnb is capitalizing on its victory 
to expand the reach of its business model through home sharing clubs.  Elizabeth Weise, 
Airbnb Flexes New Political Muscle with Plans for 100 Home-Sharing Clubs, USA TODAY, 
Nov. 4, 2015, http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/11/04/san-francisco-rejects-anti-
airbnb-measure-but-fights-not-over/75153396/ [https://perma.cc/J52V-9MMZ].  
 211.  Anthony Ha, California Regulator Passes First Ridesharing Rules, TECH CRUNCH, 
http://techcrunch.com/2013/09/19/cpuc-ridesharing-regulations [https://perma.cc/LN6L-
ESWK] (last updated Sept. 19, 2013).  
 212.  Niraj Chokshi, Colorado Passes Nation’s First Law Regulating UberX, Lyft, 
WASH. POST, June 6, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/06/06/colorado-passes-nations-
first-law-regulating-uberx-lyft/ [https://perma.cc/7TY6-S37K]. 
 213.  Peter Fricke, Arizona, Maryland Become Latest States to Pass Ridesharing 
Regulations, DAILY CALLER, http://dailycaller.com/2015/04/15/arizona-maryland-become-
latest-states-to-pass-ridesharing-regulations/?print=1 [https://perma.cc/JAW4-LYKG] (last 
updated Apr. 15, 2015 11:33 AM). 
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online petition to “Keep Hong Moving!”214  The petition garnered nearly 
50,000 signatures in support of Uber’s operations.215  Beyond transactional 
counsel, social media strategies, such as Uber’s Hong Kong petition, 
demonstrate the role disruption framers have in guiding disruptive 
innovators through creative destructive legal conflicts. 
Creative destructive legal conflict is a necessary stand-alone category 
because it faithfully tracks the actual experience of disruptive innovation.  
Neither transactional lawyering nor any particular legal discipline captures 
Uber’s experience with creative destructive legal conflict.  Law and 
entrepreneurship should do so in a comprehensive manner that connects 
Uber’s experience to all other creative destructive legal conflict, 
irrespective of legal disciplinary boundaries. 
Lawyers who specialize in discrete areas of law, such as antitrust or 
regulatory advocacy, are valuable in Uber’s situation; however, from a 
more strategic and holistic perspective, the legal counsel that most benefits 
Uber is that of a disruption framer.  The skills involved in crafting a long-
term legal strategy to facilitate the growth of a creative destructive business 
model are quite different from those of doctrinal advocacy or transactional 
advice alone.  As further explored in Part IV, public relations, social media, 
and lobbying are at least as necessary as technical legal acumen when 
disruption framers guide entrepreneurs through creative destructive legal 
conflict. 
C. Self-Driving Cars 
In contrast to Uber’s ex post approach to creative destructive legal 
conflict, other creative destructive businesses employ an ex ante legal 
strategy.  For instance, Google and other companies developing self-
driving cars moved proactively to obtain legislative permission before 
sending driverless cars onto the road en masse.216  Even without laws 
specially tailored to automated driving, self-driving cars may be legal under 
existing transportation laws.217  Consequently, even before state regulations 
were enacted to specifically address driverless cars, “Google’s fleet of 
 
 214.  Elizabeth Whitman, Hong Kong Uber Arrests: Petition Supporting App Garners 
Close to 50K Signatures, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (Aug. 2015), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/hong-kong-uber-arrests-petition-supporting-app-garners-close-50k-
signatures-2053818 [https://perma.cc/JLQ5-3VZQ].  
 215.  Id. 
 216.  John Markoff, Google Lobbies Nevada to Allow Self-Driving Cars, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/science/11drive.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/78C7-4JLH]. 
 217.  Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the United 
States, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 411, 412-15 (2014). 
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autonomous cars secretly drove more than 100,000 miles.”218 
But Google sought to avoid a showdown with regulators by 
addressing potential issues before they arose, unlike Uber’s strategy of 
pursuing business growth with full awareness that legal conflict with 
regulators would follow.  As a former legal director for Google explained, 
“[t]he tech giant wanted to make sure that before they pumped millions of 
dollars into driverless cars, the cars were explicitly legal and encouraged, 
not just probably legal and tolerated.”219  To that end, Google mobilized an 
army of state lobbyists, starting in Nevada and later extending to numerous 
other states, to smooth the road for testing self-driving cars and obtaining 
not just tacit legislative approval, but active support for developing 
driverless technology.220 
1. Creative Destructive Analysis of Self-Driving Cars 
As case studies, Tesla, Uber, and self-driving cars offer different 
lessons in how to approach creative destructive legal conflict.  The 
examples fall outside of a transactional conception of law and 
entrepreneurship and are not contained within existing doctrinal areas of 
law.  They point towards the need for disruption framers as legal counsel to 
creative destructive entrepreneurs. 
For instance, borrowing from the self-driving cars example, perhaps 
Uber could have proactively sought regulatory exemptions in advance to 
avoid legal disputes.  The company could have drafted form statutes and 
volunteered alternative regulatory categories for its business model (though 
in one location, after 18 months of fruitless discussions with city officials, 
Uber launched illegally anyway to force regulatory action).221  Part IV 
describes how disruption framers would benefit from systematic 
jurisprudential analysis that ties together different types of creative 
destructive legal strategies across history to facilitate comparisons and 
inspire effective counseling in future creative destructive situations. 
 
 218.  Amir Efrati, Google’s Driverless Car Draws Political Power, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12, 
2012, 3:14 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443493304578034822744854696 
[https://perma.cc/7W3Q-TGYL]. 
 219.  Maggie Clark, States’ Self-Driving Car Laws Open Door to More Questions than 
Answers, STATELINE (July 30, 2013), http://www.governing.com/news/state/sl-driverless-
cards-open-door-to-questions.html [http://perma.cc/6GLP-L5A4]. 
 220.  Efrati, supra note 218. 
 221.  Taylor Sopor, Q&A: Here’s Why Uber Launched in Portland Despite Being 
Illegal, GEEKWIRE (Dec. 5, 2014, 7:50 PM), http://www.geekwire.com/2014/qa-heres-uber-
launched-portland-despite-illegal/ [https://perma.cc/ED6L-ADAE]. 
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D. Crowdfunding 
A separate example of creative destructive legal conflict borrows 
elements from Uber’s strategy and elements from Google’s approach to 
self-driving cars.  Recent laws on equity crowdfunding arose after 
crowdfunding entrepreneurs initially tried the Uber way of pursuing 
business growth first, and worrying about legal violations later.222  In equity 
crowdfunding, the Uber strategy failed because equity crowdfunding sites 
that flaunted securities laws were shut down through federal223 and state224 
cease-and-desist orders. 
In one case, the ProFounder website, which facilitated equity 
investments in start-up companies through an Internet platform that brought 
entrepreneurs and investors together, was found to be in violation of 
California securities regulations.225  In another case, the BuyaBeerCompany 
website, which amassed approximately $200 million in pledges from more 
than five million potential investors in order to purchase Pabst Brewing 
Company, was found to be in violation of federal securities regulations.226  
Specifically, both websites were illegal because they allowed investors to 
purchase stock in private companies even though the stock was neither 
registered nor exempt from registration, as applicable securities laws 
require.227 
Apart from the particulars of the legal violations, the underlying cause 
of the legal conflict in equity crowdfunding is disruptive innovation.  The 
Internet and social media allow entrepreneurs to reach a worldwide 
audience of potential investors at a very low cost in a very short time.228  
Correspondingly, the Internet, social media, and electronic payment 
systems allow investors to send money to entrepreneurs instantaneously.229  
Technological advances thus facilitate a type of mass, impersonal, and 
direct investing in start-up companies that was previously impossible.230  It 
is too early to say whether the disintermediation that crowdfunding augurs 
 
 222.  C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 1, 6, 24-27, (2012). 
 223.  Cease-and-Desist Order for Michael Migliozzi II and Brian William Flatow, 
Securities Act Release No. 9216 (June 8, 2011), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2011/33-9216.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8SJ-JGWX]. 
 224.  Consent Order to Desist and Refrain from State of California Department of 
Corporations to ProFounder Fin., Inc., 1 (Aug. 31, 2011), available at 
http://www.dbo.ca.gov/ENF/pdf/2011/ProFounder_CO.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BNG-9EUT]. 
 225.  Bradford, supra note 222, at 24-27. 
 226.  Id. at 6. 
 227.  Id. at 6, 24. 
 228.  Id. at 10-14. 
 229.  Id. 
 230.  Id. 
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will ultimately prove to be a creative destructive threat to investment 
banks, venture capitalists, or some other group.  But regardless, the legal 
conflict surrounding equity crowdfunding fits within a creative destructive 
paradigm because it results directly from a disruptive innovation that 
clashes with existing laws. 
After legal violations caused early equity crowdfunding pioneers to 
fail (unlike Uber’s ongoing success in the face of legal obstacles), the 
crowdfunding movement adopted a legal strategy more similar to Google’s 
approach to laws regulating self-driving cars.  But crowdfunding advocacy 
was more widely dispersed and had a more visible social media presence 
than Google’s targeted lobbying efforts.231  The fight to pass crowdfunding 
legislation encompassed a wide variety of constituencies advocating on 
behalf of an emerging industry.232  In contrast, with respect to ride-hailing 
apps and driverless cars, the advocacy for creative destructive legal change 
was driven by particular trailblazing companies (Uber and Google), even 
though their competitors (Lyft and Mercedes, for instance) also benefitted.  
Crowdfunding laws were changed proactively through a combination of 
pressure from many corners: social media, business leaders, academics, 
politicians, entrepreneurs, and investors.233 
1. Creative Destructive Analysis of Equity Crowdfunding 
The grass-roots movement that resulted in Congress opening a 
pathway for equity crowdfunding to be practiced legally234 is an example of 
how law and entrepreneurship is not only broader than transactional law, 
but also broader than any particular legal discipline.  In the case of equity 
crowdfunding, securities law happens to be the doctrinal category where 
creative destructive legal conflict arose.235  Notably, neither antitrust nor 
intellectual property law is implicated in crowdfunding’s disruptive 
innovation; thus, the two doctrinal fields that form the backbone of 
“innovation law” are not especially helpful or even relevant for analyzing 
the legal conflicts in crowdfunding. 
In contrast, using creative destruction as the organizing principle of 
 
 231.  John S. (Jack) Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg, 
Saverin, and Venture Capitalists’ Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 583, 
597-98 (2013). 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, 126 Stat. 306 
(2012) (addressing crowdfunding in Title III). 
 235.  See generally Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation, 
84 FORDHAM L. REV. 977 (2015) (advocating a flexible regulatory approach to disruptive 
technologies in financial markets, including crowdfunding). 
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law and entrepreneurship legal conflict disregards doctrinal silos and places 
crowdfunding’s legal conflict side-by-side with cases from other legal 
disciplines, such as the Tesla, Uber, and self-driving cars examples.  If 
creative destruction were not used as the unifying theme, then the cases 
would naturally remain isolated and disconnected within their respective 
doctrinal categories.  But creative destructive legal conflict crosses 
disciplinary lines because disruptive innovations can occur in any area.  
Legal analysis should follow the business reality of creative destruction 
instead of sorting creative destructive legal conflict into separate doctrinal 
categories.  Failing to do so runs the risk of glossing over the underlying 
commonalities that doctrinally diverse creative destructive cases share. 
The crowdfunding example also demonstrates how creative 
destructive legal conflict need not be (though it often is) spearheaded by a 
particular trailblazing company; disruption framers can also work on behalf 
of industry-wide innovations that alter industry-wide laws and regulations.  
Placing examples of creative destructive legal conflict side by side, 
irrespective of doctrinal boundaries, helps reveal different legal strategies 
for different situations.  As described in Part IV, a unified, comprehensive, 
and interdisciplinary understanding of creative destructive legal conflict 
would inform the necessary skill set of disruption framers. 
E. Netflix 
Creative destructive legal conflict also arises when the innovative 
challenger uses the courts offensively.  In the previous examples of Tesla 
and Uber, the status-quo market leader was suing an innovative competitor 
to defend its perch.  But Netflix’s claims against Blockbuster illustrate the 
opposite situation.236 
Netflix created an innovative business model that destroyed 
Blockbuster.237  Netflix relied on new technologies (namely, the Internet 
and video streaming) to threaten the status-quo market leader 
(Blockbuster), which struggled to adapt to new technologies while being 
saddled with expensive brick-and-mortar locations around the world.238  
 
 236.  Netflix, Inc. v. Blockbuster, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
 237.  Dawn McCarty, Linda Sandler & Tiffany Kary, Blockbuster Files Bankruptcy After 
Online Rivals Gain, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 23, 2010, 10:35 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-09-23/blockbuster-video-rental-chain-files-
for-bankruptcy-protection [https://perma.cc/T8MK-W4YY]; Martin Peers & Shalini 
Ramachandran, Dish Network to Close Its Remaining U.S. Blockbuster Stores, WALL 
STREET JOURNAL (Nov. 6, 2013, 7:05 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303763804579181853996821712 
[https://perma.cc/B77N-F9GC]. 
 238.  Peers, supra note 237. 
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From a business perspective, it was vintage creative destruction.  Netflix 
relied on a disruptive innovation to create a new business model and a new 
market while simultaneously undermining Blockbuster’s business model 
and existing market. 
1. Creative Destructive Analysis of Netflix 
But the legal conflict it engendered shows a different wrinkle than the 
previous examples.  Instead of Blockbuster suing Netflix to prevent 
Netflix’s assault on Blockbuster’s market-leading position, Netflix went on 
the offensive and alleged that Blockbuster was in violation of Netflix’s 
intellectual property rights.239  On the same day Netflix was issued a patent 
on its Internet business model, it sued Blockbuster for patent 
infringement.240  Specifically, Netflix alleged patent violations related 
primarily to its online queue where customers maintain a prioritized list of 
movies and its rental-via-mail system that eliminated late fees for 
customers.241 
Contrary to standard transactional legal advice on how to avoid the 
courtroom, the Netflix example demonstrates another tool (proactive 
litigation) for the disruption framer’s toolbox in representing creative 
destructive entrepreneurs.  Similar examples of disruptive innovators 
(distinguished from patent trolls) who use litigation against market leaders 
should be organized around the central theme of creative destruction, 
regardless of legal discipline.  As Part IV describes, constructing a full 
panorama of creative destructive legal conflict should yield a cohesive 
strategic roadmap for disruption framers to use in advising entrepreneurs. 
F. Napster 
The innovative entrepreneur is not always victorious in creative 
destructive legal conflict.  Napster is a well-known example of an 
innovative business model that courts quashed after industry leaders 
objected.242  Napster allowed individuals to upload music to the Internet 
 
 239.  Claire Hoffman, Blockbuster.com Is Sued by Netflix, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2006), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/apr/05/business/fi-netflix5 [https://perma.cc/N9LS-EHPL]. 
 240.  Anders Bylund, Netflix Awarded Business Model Patent, Immediately Sues 
Blockbuster, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 5, 2006, 11:20 AM), 
http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2006/04/6528-2/ [https://perma.cc/JX94-E836]. 
 241.  Id.; Hoffman, supra note 239. 
 242.  A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F. 3d 1091 (2002); Vickie Feeman, et. al., 
Revenge of the Record Industry Association of America: The Rise and Fall of Napster, 9 
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 35, 43-53 (2002). 
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and share it with others, a practice known as peer-to-peer file sharing.243 
But the music industry successfully argued that Napster’s business model 
violated copyright law.244  Even more recently, another upstart 
entrepreneurial effort, Aereo TV, was also shut down due to copyright 
violations for using miniature antennas to transmit TV programs over the 
Internet.245  And, with the rise of three-dimensional (3D) printing, similar 
legal conflicts may soon arise in patent law too.246 
1. Creative Destructive Analysis of Napster 
There is thus a category of creative destructive legal conflict where 
law denies some innovative business models.  Disruption framers would 
benefit from systematic analysis of examples throughout history where 
potentially creative destructive businesses were shuttered for legal 
violations.  The examples should be categorized and gathered together 
under one jurisprudential umbrella.  Though studying the examples within 
established legal disciplines is undoubtedly useful for deepening an 
understanding of respective legal disciplines, from the perspective of a 
disruption framer who counsels entrepreneurs, the unifying theme of the 
cases is creative destruction, independent of legal disciplines. 
Furthermore, in some cases, the creative destructive business model 
that initially loses in litigation nonetheless spawns a creative destructive 
movement that ultimately upends an industry.  Though the initial 
groundbreaking entrepreneur may lose (as in Napster’s case, or the 
crowdfunding examples), the subsequent movement could ultimately 
 
 243.  Matt Richtel, The Napster Decision: The Overview; Appellate Judges Back 
Limitations on Copying Music, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/13/business/napster-decision-overview-appellate-judges-
back-limitations-copying-music.html [https://perma.cc/MD2H-VEHQ]. 
 244.  A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F. 3d 1004 (2001); Mark Lemley & R. 
Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 
56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1356-65 (2004).  For a subsequent Supreme Court case also 
involving copyright infringement claims in peer-to-peer file sharing, see MGM Studios Inc. 
v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (establishing that peer to peer file sharing services 
could be sued for copyright infringement of third parties using that service). 
 245.  American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014); 
Kevin Yoegel, Comment, The Aereo Loophole: A Retrospective Inquiry into the Legality of 
Antenna Farms and Internet-Based Television, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 339, 342-56 (2015); Krista 
Consiglio, Note, Aereo and Filmon: Technology’s Latest Copyright War and Why Aereo 
Should Survive, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2557, 2600-02 (2014). 
 246.  See Deven R. Desai & Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D Printing 
and the Digitization of Things, 102 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1695-719 (2014) (analyzing the 
intellectual property implications, especially for patent law, which arise as 3D printers make 
it increasingly inexpensive to create and copy physical objects, just as the Internet, via 
Napster, allowed consumers to easily copy and distribute digitized media). 
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produce a new regulatory approach or a new technological solution that 
sidesteps the problems that derailed the groundbreaking entrepreneur.  
Napster may be one such example, as the sharing of digital music continues 
to grow while the music industry remains in flux as it struggles to adapt to 
the digital environment that Napster exploited.  Additionally, in 
crowdfunding, new laws have already been passed to facilitate what was 
once an illegal business model.  Analyzing the examples as a unified body 
should help disruption framers advise entrepreneurs on how to pivot from 
an initial creative destructive business model that loses in court towards 
another that can succeed. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Without a systematic approach to creative destructive legal conflict, 
the seemingly disparate examples sketched above, and countless others like 
them, will remain isolated within their respective doctrinal areas.  But they 
are not disparate examples; the common thread that unites them is creative 
destruction.  And the existence of numerous examples dispersed throughout 
history shows the need for a comprehensive and systematic theoretical 
model of creative destructive legal conflict.  If the essence of 
entrepreneurship is creative destruction, then, independent of disciplinary 
boundaries, legal analysis of entrepreneurship should focus on the legal 
conflict that accompanies creative destruction. 
Furthermore, the role of lawyers in creative destructive legal conflict 
is that of disruption framers. Law and entrepreneurship is too often limited 
within the confines of transaction-based theories, which are incomplete 
because they neglect the comprehensive legal strategy that disruption 
framers design for creative destructive legal conflict.  Accordingly, could 
law and entrepreneurship reimagine the lawyer’s role?  Could disruption 
framers be viewed in the business world as visionaries who help society 
confront the challenges of creative destruction? 
Approaching law and entrepreneurship from the perspective of 
creative destructive legal conflict gives rise to two primary 
recommendations.  The first involves delineating creative destructive legal 
conflict both inside and outside the courtroom.  The second relates to the 
legal strategies of disruption framers. 
A. Jurisprudence of Creative Destruction 
For the field of law and entrepreneurship to mature, it must develop 
theoretical constructs for analyzing creative destructive legal conflict inside 
and outside of court—the law of entrepreneurship.  Otherwise, law and 
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entrepreneurship will fail to grow beyond a merely transactional account of 
business lawyers serving entrepreneurs.  It will also struggle to be more 
than a hodge-podge of analyses of seemingly random intersections that 
entrepreneurs experience with laws of diverse legal disciplines. 
Developing and explaining jurisprudential models of creative 
destructive legal conflict is a large-scale undertaking.  Future scholarship 
should rise above disciplinary lines to use creative destruction as an 
organizing principle of jurisprudence.  This approach should lead to an 
interdisciplinary jurisprudential category—creative destructive legal 
conflict—and should yield several benefits. 
For instance, a stand-alone category of creative destructive legal 
conflict can facilitate empirical analysis of cases unified through a common 
economic principle, irrespective of traditional legal disciplinary areas.  
Commonalities in legal strategy can be recognized among entrepreneurial 
firms whose business models prevailed in creative destructive litigation.  
And, importantly, lessons from those that failed can be gathered and 
studied systematically. 
Furthermore, creative destructive legal conflict can be compared and 
contrasted along numerous different metrics.  The metrics could follow 
legal criteria (such as state court versus federal court, regulatory battles 
versus congressional advocacy, statutory law versus common law, civil law 
versus common law (extending the adaptability hypothesis),247 contract 
rights versus property rights, formal/licensed market participants versus 
informal/unlicensed actors) or doctrinal distinctions (such as intellectual 
property law versus securities law).  The metrics could also track non-legal 
criteria (such as creative destructive legal conflict involving entrepreneurial 
firms headed by women versus those headed by men, or those led by one 
racial group versus those led by another).  Additionally, the metrics could 
break down by business category (such as telecommunications versus 
construction), or be examined by characteristics of the entrepreneurial firm 
(such as new start-ups—e.g., those with less than one or two years of 
operational history—versus more established entrepreneurial firms, or 
creative destructive legal conflict among public versus private companies).  
Furthermore, venture-backed firms involved in creative destructive legal 
conflict could be compared with non-venture-backed firms that experience 
creative destructive legal conflict. 
In short, there remains a significant and largely untapped data source 
of case law in the area of entrepreneurship where law has perhaps its most 
profound impact: creative destructive legal conflict that entrepreneurial 
 
 247.  See supra Part I; Smith & Ueda, supra note 60, at 364 (discussing how courts 
influence the relationship between law and entrepreneurship). 
ARTICLE 3 (WROLDSEN) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/16  9:33 PM 
782 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:3 
 
businesses encounter.  Law and entrepreneurship scholars should construct 
a more robust jurisprudential theory and develop paradigms that guide 
entrepreneurs, judges, and legislators towards optimal solutions in 
particular creative destructive situations.  Systematic analysis of creative 
destructive legal conflict should also benefit disruption framers in devising 
strategies for advising entrepreneurs who embark on a creative destructive 
path. 
B. Disruption Framers 
As an integral part of an entrepreneurial firm’s leadership team, 
disruption framers strategize with entrepreneurs on how to successfully 
navigate the legal minefield that creative destructive businesses often 
encounter.  Disruption framers conceptualize societal change whose 
impetus is innovative business ideas.248  Like storytellers, disruption 
framers mold a legal narrative around ground-breaking ideas.249  In a 
business plan, entrepreneurs craft a narrative to explain how the company 
will disrupt existing markets or create new markets; disruption framers in 
turn craft a narrative to explain how the company will coexist with current 
laws or seek to create new legal frameworks around a novel business idea. 
And framing arguments can be especially effective in the context of 
creative destructive legal conflict.250  Disputes over technological advances 
 
 248.  Disruption framers’ strategic role also encompasses anticipation of new liabilities 
that arise from new technologies.  Bryant Walker Smith, Proximity-Driven Liability, 102 
GEO. L.J. 1777, 1788-94 (2014). 
 249.  See Steven H. Hobbs, Entrepreneurship and Law: Accessing the Power of the 
Creative Impulse, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1, 15 (2009) (observing that “lawyers have 
always been known as great storytellers,” and advocating that lawyers use storytelling skills 
to serve entrepreneur clients).  See also David Daokui Li, Junxin Feng & Hongping Jiang, 
Institutional Entrepreneurs, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 358, 358-62 (2006) (recognizing “skills 
beyond those of a traditional entrepreneur, such as dealing with government officials and 
public opinion” that entrepreneurs must develop, but without considering the lawyer’s role 
in advising entrepreneurs). 
 250.  Kimberlianne Podlas, The Moral of the Story . . . Musical Artists Must Protect 
Their Own Rights in Digital Music, 10 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 265, 267-68 (2010) 
(explaining that “the framing of a legal dispute often impacts its outcome,” and that 
“[p]articularly, in the field of intellectual property and technology, courts regularly reach out 
for stories and analogies to simplify and explain complicated issues”); see also Anuj C. 
Desai, Legal Traditionalism, Creative Destruction, and the Role of Media Law in the 
Intergenerational Social Contract, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 167, 172-73 (2011) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in “Sony and Grokster can best be explained by thinking about 
the social meaning of the case[s]”); Chris Riley, The Rite of Rhetoric: Cognitive Framing in 
Technology Law, 9 NEV. L.J. 495, 537-40 (2009) (demonstrating that winning briefs use 
effective framing); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not 
an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1180 (2003) (establishing that “judgments will be 
much affected by the framing of the question”). 
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often involve particularly “ambiguous terminology and uncertain social 
policy” precisely because they arise from new, innovative, and previously-
undefined subjects with little direct historical precedent.251  As a result, 
judges have significant interpretive flexibility and may rely implicitly on 
equitable judgments, which can be influenced through framing arguments 
that draw connections between known scenarios from the past and new 
situations.252  Creating effective frames for interpreting novel legal 
questions in creative destructive legal conflict, then, is a valuable skill set 
for disruption framers to develop. 
1. Law, Strategy, and Competitive Advantage 
Consequently, the disruption framer paradigm goes well beyond 
transaction cost engineering.  It builds most directly from frameworks that 
combine law, strategy, and competitive advantage, as described in Part I.D.  
And disruption framers fit within law and strategy scholars’ highest levels 
of integration between legal and business functions. 
For instance, in Tesla’s case, under Bird’s framework,253 the company 
could have chosen an avoidance path by conforming to existing dealership 
regulations.  Instead, driven by the company’s disruptive innovations, 
Tesla’s business and legal strategy transforms the company itself and, in 
the process, the auto industry, too.  Tesla’s direct sales model reinforces a 
unique and close connection to its customers that differentiates Tesla from 
all other car manufacturers.  And other car manufacturers cannot imitate 
Tesla’s approach because they have helped enshrine the dealership model 
in state law, thereby painting themselves into a corner that legally requires 
them to sell their cars through independent dealers.  Tesla, therefore, 
 
 251.  Riley, supra note 250, at 539.  See also Donald Labriola, Dissonant Paradigms and 
Unintended Consequences: Can (and Should) the Law Save Us from Technology?, 16 RICH. 
J.L. & TECH. 1, 15-60 (2009) (discussing cognitive dissonance in the context of legal 
conflict related to technological change). 
 252.  Riley, supra note 250, at 539-40 (describing a successful argument that framed 
creative destructive legal conflict as an illegal piracy theme instead of using a text-based 
analysis); Brad Bernthal, Procedural Architecture Matters: Innovation Policy at the Federal 
Communications Commission, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 615, 641-54 (2014) (analyzing how 
advocates before the Federal Communications Commission utilize several “stylized ‘plays’” 
to influence “how policy-makers frame and analyze [novel telecommunications] issues”); 
Desai, supra note 250, at 172-73 (recounting the successful argument that framed the 
legitimate corporate context of institutional research and development at a well-known 
company against innovation from a competitor that “arose from a hacker culture . . . based 
in the West Indies . . . [with] software [that] had been written by Estonian programmers 
working outside any institutional structure at all, or at least one recognizable to the Court.”). 
 253.  See supra Part I.D (explaining the five pathways in Bird’s framework for 
integrating law and business strategies). 
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derives a competitive advantage against other car manufacturers because its 
legal strategy allows Tesla to be treated differently under the law than all of 
its competitors.  And Tesla exploits its unique legal treatment to create a 
closer, almost cult-like relationship with its customers, thus demonstrating 
the integration of sales and marketing strategy with legal strategy. 
Of course, Tesla’s unique legal treatment does result in legal conflict, 
which can be costly.  But Tesla’s strategy transforms even its legal conflict 
into a competitive advantage.  Tesla has a well-developed social media and 
publicity strategy that frames Tesla’s legal conflict in favorable terms.  
Tesla promotes the straightforward, commonsense message that it simply 
seeks the freedom to sell its products directly to consumers without the 
intrusion and added cost of middlemen.  Car dealerships, in contrast, are 
made to appear antiquated, opposed to progress, and insulated from 
competition after years of campaign contributions to state legislators 
produced what Tesla frames as protectionist laws.  Tesla’s law and policy 
strategy thus further complements its business strategy by uniting Tesla 
supporters behind a common goal and against a common enemy, 
reinforcing customer loyalty. 
In Uber’s case, Siedel’s framework254 illuminates how the company’s 
legal strategy reframes legal obstacles as business opportunities.  Instead of 
viewing restrictive and prohibitive taxi regulations as a barrier to entry for 
the Uber app, Uber has aggressively set up shop in hundreds of markets 
worldwide.  Uber could have shied away from legal conflict, knowing that 
its business model and the sharing economy was at best unregulated due its 
novelty, or at worst in stark violation of existing laws.  But Uber’s strategy 
instead reframes legal obstacles as opportunities to establish the Uber brand 
and generate positive publicity as Uber battles taxi companies that are well-
connected in local politics and have historically enjoyed government 
protection from competition through legally mandated taxi medallions.  
Through its disruptive innovation, therefore, Uber reframes legal obstacles 
into a business opportunity by advocating for changes in laws to 
accommodate new technologies. 
In addition, Bagley’s paradigm255 of legal astuteness is a helpful lens 
for analyzing law and strategy in the other four examples highlighted in 
Part III.  Google demonstrated a high level of legal astuteness in obtaining 
favorable regulation for self-driving cars, prior to any legal conflict, 
through targeted lobbying in only a few states.  Netflix also demonstrated a 
high level of legal astuteness in its creative destructive legal conflict with 
 
 254.  See supra Part I.D (explaining Siedel’s four step framework for companies to use 
law strategically to create competitive advantages). 
 255.  See supra Part I.D (describing Bagley’s approach to developing competitive 
advantages through legal astuteness). 
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Blockbuster because Netflix prepared its preemptive patent strategy in 
advance and waited patiently to execute it.  In contrast, the initial attempts 
at equity crowdfunding exemplified a low level of legal astuteness because 
lack of knowledge or disregard of securities laws caused pioneering equity 
crowdfunding sites to be shut down.  More astute legal advice intertwined 
with business strategy could have saved both crowdfunding sites if legal 
strategy had been implemented proactively before the websites violated 
securities laws.  Similarly, Napster and Aereo were both forced to shut 
down their innovative business models due to violations of copyright law, 
betraying, in the court’s final analysis, failed legal astuteness. 
2. Interdisciplinary Skills 
Understanding law and entrepreneurship through a strategic lens as 
more than a transactional discipline—and embracing the lawyer’s role as 
that of disruption framer instead of transaction cost engineer—has 
implications for doctrinal legal education, cross-disciplinary education in 
business fields, and clinical legal education.  Doctrinally, jurisprudence and 
advocacy coursework should incorporate creative destructive legal conflict.  
Typically, legal education for students interested in representing 
entrepreneurs has involved transactional law courses.  But this is a lawyer-
centric approach.  An entrepreneur-centric paradigm would take the focus 
away from transactional work alone and encompass a broader range of 
skills that a disruption framer would use to counsel entrepreneurs through 
creative destructive legal conflict. 
At least in the context of entrepreneurship, it is a false and lawyer-
centric dichotomy to separate transactional and litigation work too rigidly.  
Transactional attorneys are bent on avoiding litigation, but disruption 
framers sometimes must embrace litigation and integrate it as part of a 
creative destructive legal strategy, as Part III highlighted.  The advice of 
disruption framers may include transactional and regulatory guidance, of 
course, but it also captures lobbying, public relations, social media, and 
litigation strategy (in addition to cross-disciplinary business skills 
described below).  A disruption framer paradigm enhances transactional 
and strategic advice because disruption framers, guided by an awareness of 
creative destructive jurisprudence, counsel entrepreneurs with an eye 
towards litigation planning, not necessarily towards litigation avoidance.  
Disruption framers embrace the idea that legal conflict is more than a 
possibility; it may be welcomed or intended as part of a creative destructive 
legal strategy. 
Cross-disciplinary training is particularly vital for disruption framers.  
But where the transaction cost engineer framework calls for cross-
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disciplinary training in finance and accounting,256 a disruption framer 
paradigm encourages a wider set of cross-disciplinary skills.257  For 
instance, disruption framers should be versed in entrepreneurship, strategic 
management and public relations, marketing and social media, economics 
and political science, as well as traditional legal skills in advocacy, 
litigation, and business transactions. 
Accordingly, business schools should incorporate the view of lawyers 
as disruption framers into business coursework on law, entrepreneurship, 
and strategic management.  Unfortunately, under a transactional model, 
business people sometimes begrudge lawyers as unavoidable transaction 
costs (e.g., a perfunctory $200,000 legal bill to close a transaction), or in 
the best case, appreciate them as efficient reducers of transaction costs 
(e.g., a worthy $200,000 legal bill that helped avoid millions of dollars in 
other costs and liabilities).258  But when lawyers are viewed as more than 
transactional advisors and become integral members of a company’s 
strategic management team, then legal strategy can become an enduring 
competitive advantage and positively impact a firm’s bottom line.259 
For lawyers to become strategic partners in the context of creative 
destructive entrepreneurship, lawyers must be deployed as disruption 
framers who craft proactive strategies for the legal conflict that disruptive 
innovation so often entails.  One of the most important competitive 
advantages for creative destructive entrepreneurs to develop is the firm’s 
disruptive innovation.  Entrepreneurs, therefore, should look to lawyers as 
disruption framers who help fashion an overarching legal strategy for 
disruptive innovations instead of viewing lawyers in the more generic roles 
of transactional advisors or litigation advocates.  Creative destructive 
entrepreneurship is unique and demands its own breed of lawyer—one with 
cross-disciplinary skills that are usually outside the standard toolbox of 
transactional and litigation attorneys alike. 
In law school clinics, the transaction-based paradigm is so ingrained 
that entrepreneurship law clinics typically disclaim litigation services from 
the outset.260  A disruption framer paradigm, though, can help open 
 
 256.  Gilson, supra note 8, at 303-05 (discussing the potential to correct the “mismatch 
of business law education and business law practice”). 
 257.  For a hypothetical (and extreme) cross-disciplinary approach that would integrate 
the STEM fields (science, technology, engineering, and math) into legal education, see 
Daniel Martin Katz, The MIT School of Law? A Perspective on Legal Education in the 21st 
Century, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1431, 1457-70 (2014). 
 258.  E.g., Bird, supra note 85, at 12-16, 27-31 (contrasting a negative “avoidance” view 
of law with a positive “value-creation” perspective). 
 259.  See supra Part I.D (explaining that framing legal issues as business opportunities 
can be a highly effective strategy). 
 260.  See supra Part I.A (discussing the transactional law skills that entrepreneurship law 
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entrepreneurship law clinics to a broader range of services, including, for 
example, general civil litigation, lobbying, and policy advocacy on behalf 
of entrepreneurs.  In some cases, creative destructive legal conflict may 
only arise after entrepreneurs reach a certain level of commercial success, 
thus disqualifying those entrepreneurs from receiving services from need-
based clinical programs (though not necessarily from clinics that focus on 
student-led entrepreneurship).261  Nonetheless, an increased awareness that 
entrepreneurs benefit from litigation (and other non-transactional) 
assistance could help reduce the lawyer-centric silos that typically separate 
transactional advice from litigation advocacy. 
For example, some recent clinical efforts strive to help small 
businesses that face patent litigation.262  In addition, helping entrepreneurs 
through litigation can also complement the social justice mission that 
clinics often pursue.263  For instance, one clinic in New York pursues both 
litigation and transactional matters in providing “civil legal services to 
grassroots community organizing groups that engage in a variety of 
community development, economic justice and social justice efforts.”264  
And a transactional clinic serving entrepreneurs in Chicago is affiliated 
with a sponsoring organization that pursues litigation “to enhance 
entrepreneurial opportunities and to strike down arbitrary and 
unconstitutional laws that stifle honest enterprise” in an effort to aid 
entrepreneurs and small businesses.265  Entrepreneurs often need more than 
just transactional legal assistance, especially in the context of creative 
destructive legal conflict, so clinical programs that recognize and serve 
entrepreneurs’ diverse legal needs can take a valuable step towards helping 
students become future disruption framers. 
 
clinics typically develop and describing that such clinics typically do not provide litigation 
services). 
 261.  As an example, the Entrepreneurship Clinic at the University of Michigan Law 
School assists “student-led entrepreneurial ventures.” FAQs about the Clinic, U. MICH. L. 
SCH. ENTREPRENEURSHIP CLINIC, 
https://www.law.umich.edu/clinical/entrepreneurshipclinic/about/Pages/FAQs-About-the-
Clinic.aspx [https://perma.cc/R54M-SGGL] (last visited May 28, 2015). 
 262.  See, e.g., Steven Seidenberg, Law School Clinics Join to Help Battle Patent Trolls, 
ABA JOURNAL (Mar. 1, 2015, 2:50 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/law_school_clinics_join_to_help_battle_patent
_trolls [https://perma.cc/6GVQ-VB63].  
 263.  See Jones & Lainez, supra note 26, at 89 (observing that “true to their social justice 
underpinnings, transactional clinics often serve a social justice mission”). 
 264.  Cmty. Dev. & Econ. Justice Clinic: Course Description, N.Y.U. SCH. OF L. 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/academics/clinics/semester/commdeveconjustice 
[https://perma.cc/AK7Y-3QLF] (last visited May 28, 2015). 
 265.  William H. Mellor & Patricia H. Lee, Institute for Justice Clinic on 
Entrepreneurship: A Real World Model Stimulating Private Enterprise in the Inner City, 5 
J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 71, 72 (2001). 
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In sum, disruption framers specialize in overarching issues and 
develop legal strategy for entrepreneurs in a creative destructive context.  A 
systematic and unified jurisprudence of creative destruction would equip 
disruption framers with a historical roadmap to counsel entrepreneurs more 
effectively.  It would guide disruption framers down recognized pathways 
to success, and missteps would be easier to avoid by referencing an 
organized and comprehensive corpus of how creative destructive legal 
strategies have failed in the past. 
CONCLUSION 
Law and entrepreneurship will struggle for a jurisprudential identity to 
the extent it remains tethered to a transaction-based account of 
entrepreneurship or surrenders analysis of creative destructive legal conflict 
to disparate legal disciplines.  All creative destructive legal conflict should 
be consolidated as one unified body—the law of entrepreneurship—which 
will in turn guide disruption framers’ strategic counsel to entrepreneurs 
who transform business and even society through disruptive innovations.  
Systematic study of creative destructive legal conflict would identify norms 
and help delineate paths of successful and unsuccessful entrepreneurial 
efforts throughout history.  The organizing principle of the law of 
entrepreneurship should be the legal conflict that arises in the defining 
crucible of entrepreneurship: creative destruction. 
 
